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American policy in the Persian Gulf since the end of the
Gulf War has dangerously overemphasized military instruments
to protect United States interests in the region. This
military focus suggests that threats to American interests are
external and visible. At the same time it neglects the
challenges posed to U.S. interests by internal political
upheaval in the pro-American regimes of the Gulf Cooperation
Council and ignores the societal disruptions associated with
modernizing societies. Despite their considerable oil wealth,
these polities will be increasingly vulnerable to instability
if the regimes in power continue their monopoly on political
power. Moreover, the highly visible and active presence of
American armed forces in the Gulf today intensifies the
perception of the U.S. as an imperial super power and
unknowingly threatens to undermine the stability of the GCC
states by providing opposition groups with a powerful symbol
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
American policy in the Persian Gulf since the end of the
Gulf War has dangerously overemphasized military instruments
to protect United States interests in the region. This
military focus suggests that threats to American interests are
external and visible and neglects the challenges posed to
those interests by internal political upheaval in the Persian
Gulf Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Despite
their considerable oil wealth, these polities will be
increasingly vulnerable to instability if the ruling families
continue their tight hold on political power. Moreover, the
highly visible and active presence of American armed forces in
the Gulf today intensifies the perception of the U.S. as an
imperial superpower and unknowingly threatens to undermine the
stability of the GCC states by providing opposition groups
with a powerful symbol with which to challenge the political
status quo.
The geographic isolation of the Arabian peninsula and
conservative impact of history upon these societies rendered
them particularly unprepared for the penetration of European
powers and advent of oil in the past century. The process of
modernization and development from deeply traditional family
and tribal-based societies to "modern" societies is a turbu-
lent evolution. As this transition has progressed throughout
VI
the 20th century, old structures of traditional society are
broken down and new social groups emerge demanding more say in
the decision-making process of their political system. Invar-
iably, this development is destabilizing.
The Arab states of the Arabian peninsula have been blessed
with tremendous oil reserves and for the past 30 years have
accumulated considerable wealth. Control of this wealth,
concentrated in the hands of the ruling families of the GCC
states, has enabled them to consolidate their political
position by redistributing that wealth to the citizens of the
nations. In other words, they have been able to "buy"
political stability. It would be folly, however, for American
policy makers to assume that economic prosperity equals
political stability. The U.S. experience with Iran
illustrates the potential consequences of this assumption.
Social groups, both new and traditional, are increasingly
becoming politically aware and demanding more say in the
political process of their countries. Whether the new middle
class, Right-oriented and conservative Islamicists or even the
large (but thus far politically docile) expatriate popula-
tions, these peoples will increasingly demand greater partici-
pation. To ignore this is a mistake.
Efforts by the ruling families of the GCC to expand
political participation in their respective polities are not
encouraging. The only electoral institution in existence
today in the Gulf is Kuwait's recently elected parliament.
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Efforts by other Gulf regimes to expand their system have
received little more than lip service. Indeed, in recent
years, the trend appears to be in the opposite direction and
ruling families seem to be increasing their political
monopoly.
If this continues, these new and traditional social groups
will turn to other means to express their views. The toppling
of other Middle Eastern monarchies by both pan-Arab national-
ists or pan-Islamist nationalists demonstrates how these
ideologies provide vehicles to mobilize political support in
opposition to traditionally-based regimes. Despite the
considerable philosophical divergence of these two ideologies,
the one symbol they have been able to exploit with effect has
been anti-imperialism.
The unprecedented peacetime expansion of American military
power in the Gulf since the end of Desert Storm provides
potentially destabilizing groups in pro-American GCC socie-
ties with a powerful symbol with which to oppose the ruling
families. While each military action that we have conducted
since the end of the war can be argued on its own merits,
policy makers need to look at the whole picture and realize
the image that it presents. It is an image of deep associa-
tion between American military (imperial) power and the con-
tinued survival and prosperity of the ruling families. The





Almost anything that we do in a foreign country-
produces side-effects, that is, consequences other
than those explicit to the work itself, which in many
cases are more important than the direct end result of
our action. [Ref. l:p. 209]
American policy in the Persian Gulf since the end of the
Gulf War for Kuwait has dangerously overemphasized military
instruments to protect United States interests in the region.
Two important implications can be derived from this military
focus. First, it assumes that the military forces can ade-
quately protect U.S. interests and generally neglects the
intensity of the internal problems associated with transition-
ing societies. These internal difficulties are often more
hazardous to U.S. interests than the external challenges the
military forces are designed to deter and counter. Second,
the historic perception of the United States as an imperial
super power is intensified by the highly visible and active
presence of American armed forces in the Gulf today. This can
contribute to the destabilization of the pro-American regimes
of the Persian Gulf, and ultimately undermine the primary
objective of U.S. policy- -continued free flow of oil to the
Western industrialized nations.
Historically, Western policy in the Middle East has tended
to focus on overt, external challenges to its interests at the
neglect, intentional or otherwise, of more subtle threats.
Simply stated, the overt threats were identified in military
terms while internal disruptions tended to be more political
and social in nature. At times, this policy has been
appropriate. The British bilateral treaty arrangements with
the Gulf Arab Shaykhdoms in the 19th century specifically
guaranteed protection from external threats emanating either
from the interior of the Arabian Peninsula or from Imperial
Russian expansion south into the region. British policy, at
the same time, generally avoided interfering with internal
politics of those tribal societies and was successful well
into the 20th century. [Ref. 2:p. 656]
The impact of Western power, oil and the subsequent
modernization of these societies, however, ushered in dramatic
changes affecting all aspects of Middle East life. The
radical transformation in the region that resulted, created a
wide variety of novel threats to Western interests. While
some remained familiar (i.e., the Soviet Union), others proved
less recognizable, pervasive and more subtle. British, and
later American policy, in many ways failed to acknowledge
these new challenges. In the 1950s, real difficulties began
to emerge
.
The 1950s witnessed a series of major attempts by
Britain and the United States to bolster their
strategic interests in the region. The means they
chose closely involved Syria and exacerbated her
domestic tensions. Each of these efforts failed and
in the process served to accentuate anti-Western
sentiment in Syria and other Arab countries.
[Ref. 3:p. 4]
Western efforts to establish a regional security pact
designed to counter Soviet expansion into the Middle East
failed to recognize political dynamics within individual
countries as well as within the region as a whole. The
specific force at work was Pan-Arab nationalism. The
establishment of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 as well as the
announcement of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957- -both directed
toward a Communist threat- -allowed Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and
Saudi Arabia to become, in effect, open allies of the United
States
.
They were rewarded with American arms and money, but
both they and their patrons paid the price of
widespread protest and condemnation. This helped pave
the way for the armed insurrection that plunged
Lebanon into anarchy beginning in May 1958 and the
military coup that liquidated the Iraqi monarchy two
months later. [Ref. 3:p. 5]
Indeed, many observers have suggested that American
preoccupation with the Soviet threat during this period
undermined the original aim of the policy, and contributed to
the spread of Soviet influences in the region and the turn of
many Arab nations to the non-aligned movement. 1
The American assumption of security responsibility in the
Persian Gulf following the British withdrawal in 1971 resulted
lSee Seth Tillman's The United States in the Middle East ,
George Lenczowski ' s American Presidents and the Middle East ,
and Manfred Halpern's The Politics of Social Change in the
Middle East and North Africa.
in the establishment of the Twin Pillars policy. Deriving
from the philosophy of the Nixon Doctrine and shaped by the
American experience in Viet Nam, this structure rested on the
two "pillars" of Saudi Arabia and Iran, and envisioned using
those countries as military proxies for the United States to
maintain stability and provide a bulwark against Soviet moves
into the region. The problem was that it tended to neglect
what was happening inside Iran and Saudi Arabia by
concentrating on the external Soviet threat. Moreover, the
strategy was actually undermining the very stability upon
which Twin Pillars was founded, ultimately contributing to the
fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, as well as the disturbing
seizure of the Holy Mosque in Mecca that same year by militant
Islamicists. As Maya Chadda noted, "what undid Carter was not
the Soviet Union in the final analysis, but domestic
developments in U.S. proxies- -Iran and Saudi Arabia in
1979. ..." [Ref . 4 :p. 235]
To highlight American ignorance of what was happening
domestically in Iran, President Carter, in December 1977,
while visiting Teheran, made a statement praising Iran as "an
island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the
world." [Ref. 5:p. 188] Just a month later, the preliminar-
ies of the revolution erupted marking the commencement of a
long year of domestic revolt that culminated in the collapse
of the monarchy in February 1979.
In the wake of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the Carter Doctrine
was announced proclaiming that "any attempt by an outside
force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be
regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United
States of America, and an assault will be repelled by any
means necessary, including military force." While the
doctrine properly recognized a viable threat from Soviet
adventurism, it set the tone for the turbulent decade to
follow in the region that overemphasized the "outside" threat,
to the neglect of "a far more likely scenario- -that control or
curtailment of oil supplies might be effected, not by an
outsider, but rather by a belligerent insider, such as
revolutionary Iran." [Ref. 6:p. 418]
The 1980s, indeed, proved a turbulent time for American
interests in the Persian Gulf and saw policy makers reacting
increasingly with military instruments. John Duke Anthony
noted ominously in 1987 that
...the inclination of many in the Reagan Administra-
tion to down-play local initiatives in international
crisis areas, and to use armed intervention when US
interests have appeared indirectly or potentially
threatened, does not bode well for what is at stake
with regard to long-term American interests in the
Gulf." [Ref. 6:p. 431]
Direct U.S. military involvement in the Gulf in the later
stages of the Iran- Iraq war and, of course, the deployment of
half -a-million men and women to the Arabian Peninsula
following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, underline
Anthony's warning. Regardless of the military successes of
both operations Earnest Will (Kuwaiti tanker re-flagging
operation) and Desert Shield/Storm, the fact that those
deployments had to be made in the first place, indicates a
failure in policy.
Today, washed with the success of the liberation of
Kuwait, it is easy to fall back into the comfortable idea that
American military strength in the Persian Gulf, and Middle
East in general, will adequately protect our vital interests
in that region. That is, the need to secure oil reserves for
Western industrialized nations. The United States, however,
can ill-afford, politically and economically, to conduct
large-scale deployments half-way around the world every three
or four years to ensure those oil sources are protected.
Further, this thinking refuses to acknowledge what the
preceding brief review has attempted to suggest : that Western
policy makers have consistently neglected to recognize the
challenges that internal, domestic developments pose to U.S.
interests, and focus, instead, on more tangible, outside and
visible threats. This neglect, it is being argued, has
contributed to the loss of many opportunities and forced
policy makers to react with military instruments that often
serve only to undermine and convolute their ultimate
objective
.
American policy today in the Persian Gulf is threatening
to make the same mistake. The overt military embrace with the
Gulf Arab regimes is unprecedented and, as before, refuses to
recognize, or even attempt to ascertain what such an embrace
might be doing to the political base and legitimacy of the
pro-American regimes in power. The validity of the policy
should not be assumed by the current perceived eagerness of
these governments to embrace American power. Indeed, if
Iraq's King Faisal or Iran's Reza Shah had fully appreciated
the impact of their pro-western stance on their internal
domestic position, their heirs may well be in power today.
King Hussein's agile political maneuvering and arms length
approach to the West has maintained his position on the Jordan
throne for nearly four decades despite severe internal and
external challenges to his legitimacy during that time.
While the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
have traditionally been the most stable of all the Middle East
countries, it would be tragic if the U.S. repeated the same
mistake as it did with Iran and others, all because policy
makers assumed that the friendly regimes were stable and that
their policies were not undermining that stability. There are
many elements within these societies, both new and
traditional, that may see an opportunity to advance their
position by taking advantage of the confusion and difficulties
that characterize a transitioning and modernizing nation.
Regardless of the ideology they adopt, be it Islamicism, Pan-
Arabism or even liberalism, the one factor that has
historically brought opposition forces together in this
region, has been anti- imperialism. A failure to recognize
this and the impact that our overt, military-oriented policy-
could have on the regimes in power, can only result in
continued difficulty.
For this thesis, the primary American objective in the
Persian Gulf is to ensure the free flow of oil to the Western
industrialized nations. 2 [Ref. 6:p. 431.] In order to
maintain this goal, the stability and current political and
economic policies of the Gulf Arab states should be continued
and strengthened. Political instability in these countries,
with the potential for revolution, is considered to be a major
threat to this American objective.
This thesis will first examine the traditional societies
of the Arabian peninsula, the impact of foreign influences and
the process of modernization, with a particular emphasis on
group assimilation and political participation. This chapter
will demonstrate the disruptive and often chaotic nature of
transitioning societies to understand the destabilizing
political impact that emerging social groups, with raised
expectations and increased awareness, have upon the internal
politics of the society. The next chapter will discuss
efforts by the GCC polities to increase political
participation within the decision making process, as well as
2See John Duke Anthony's essay, "The Persian Gulf:
Stability, Access to Oil, and Security," pp. 415-418, in Peter
J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger, Eds., Ideology and Power
in the Middle East . Duke University Press, 1988.
examine some of the broad groups in these societies that are,
or potentially will, demand greater say in the government. A
failure to assimilate these groups will make them more
vulnerable to radical ideologies, Left or Right, that mobilize
populist support with symbology. Most often this is anti-
imperialism. The last main chapter will detail events since
the Gulf War to show the overemphasis of the military
component of American policy and how that overemphasis is
being perceived in the Middle East. That perception can be
used by social groups in these societies to mobilize support
in opposition to the pro-American ruling families, ultimately
undermining the political stability of these societies.
II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND STABILITY
The rates of social mobilization and the expansion of
political participation are high; the rates of
political organization and institutionalization are
low. The result is political instability and
disorder. The primary problem of politics is the lag
in the development of political institutions behind
social and economic change. [Ref. 7:p. 5]
With the demise of the Soviet Union and consequent end of
the Cold War, American policy makers are finally free to
examine the developing world without the blinders of East -West
competition. Policy makers may now be able to objectively
view the problems in Third World countries and understand
their continuing difficulties more in the context of social
upheaval associated with the transition of traditional
societies to modern societies, and less in the context of
ant i -communism. Indeed, political, social and economic
modernization represents the real source of challenges to
American interests in the Middle East and elsewhere in the
world. That discontented elements in these transitioning
societies adopt Marxism or Islamic Fundamentalism to combat
pro-western regimes- -internally and externally- -makes little
difference in the end if they are successful. Ideologies,
Left or Right, are appealing because they apply symbols to
discontented individuals and groups in societies that allow
them to understand the problems that derive from social
10
upheaval. Since the Second World War, the symbol most often
used to mobilize these groups in society has been anti-
Westernism or anti-imperialism.
This chapter will demonstrate the inherent instability
associated with the transition of a traditional Middle Eastern
society to a modern society. It will begin with a brief
historic and sociopolitical overview to show the insular and
conservative nature of pre-20th century Arabian societies. We
will then examine the process of modernization to provide a
social and political framework for transitioning societies to
apply to specific historic factors that impacted upon the
Arabian peninsula. After illustrating how these factors
contributed to the development of the absolute monarchies, we
will conclude with some specific problems associated with
modernizing regimes of this kind.
A. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The Arabian Peninsula has, throughout history, been
relatively untouched by the great events and empires that have
existed on its periphery. This is particularly true of the
interior, and thus the impact of these foreign influences on
Arabian society has been minimal. [Ref. 8:p. 285] The
extremely inhospitable environment that characterizes the
peninsula, combined with the geographic location of the region
with respect to the great cultures and powers of pre-20th
century history, has been responsible for the insular nature
11
of Arabia. Whether thrusting "like a thick wedge" between
Egypt and Babylonia [Ref
. 9:p. 32] , standing between the great
Byzantine and Persian empires, or on the frontier of the
Ottoman and Safavid dynasties, the region has escaped the
physical conquest and cultural influence of these contending
societies. Attempts by Roman, Persian and Ottoman empires to
extend control over the peninsula generally ended in failure.
[Ref. 8 :p. 284]
.
This is not to say that the region existed completely in
a vacuum. Territories on the rim engaged in considerable
trade with the outside world. On the western edge, along the
coast of the Red Sea, the great Incense Trail carried
frankincense, spices and myrrh from southern Arabia, or Arabia
Felix, to the Levant along the Mediterranean coast. The great
cities of Mecca and Medina acquired significant trading status
long before their fame as the birthplace of Islam became
prominent
.
In the east, along the coastline of the Persian Gulf, the
communities were more oriented toward the sea, and have
enjoyed a long tradition of intercontinental communication.
[Ref. 8:p. 284] Bahrain has a history as an entrepot between
the Indus Valley and the Sumerian city of Ur (southern Iraq)
going back more than 5000 years. [Ref. 10 :p. 2] With the
advent of Islam, in addition to advancements in navigation and
shipbuilding, Persian Gulf peoples opened extensive trading
links with Africa and the Far East. The "Arabs remained the
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leading sailors and traders throughout the Indian Ocean to the
end of the fifteenth century and the coming of the
Portuguese." [Ref. 10 :p. 3]
The rise of Islam, out of the western edge of the Arabian
peninsula in the 7th century, represents one of the most far-
reaching events in history. Its impact upon the Middle East
alone as a unifying force, is considerable, giving rise to the
great Islamic empires under Ummayad and Abbasid rule, as well
as Safavid Persia and the Ottoman Dynasties. Interestingly,
however, the center of these Islamic polities shifted quickly
to the more cosmopolitan centers of Syria and the Fertile
Crescent, leaving the peoples of the Arabian peninsula to
their traditional nomadic and tribal ways. As C.A.O. Van
Nieuwenhui j ze noted in Sociology of the Middle East , "Arabia
has at an early date in Islamic history become somewhat
marginal to the Arab world and to the Middle East. Until
fairly recently, it was a bit of a sociocultural museum, with
relative inaccessibility as its main device for conservation."
[Ref. 8:p. 285.]
1 . European Penetration
While the hinterland of the peninsula would remain
relatively isolated until the 20th century, the Arab peoples
inhabiting the coastline of the Persian Gulf began to
experience foreign penetration nearly 400 years earlier. In
the early 16th century, the Portuguese began to penetrate the
area through both commercial and military means. As early as
13
1507, they had established themselves in Bahrain and remained
until driven out by the Safavids in 1602. Portuguese
preeminence was displaced by the Dutch, and ultimately the
British, following a century-long commercial rivalry between
the latter two European powers.
The primary British interest in the region, however,
increasingly concerned the protection of her lines of communi-
cation with her Indian empire. This concern intensified with
the rising Russian threat to Persia and Afghanistan in the
18th century, as well as Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798.
Reacting to the increasing perception of challenges to her
trade routes with India, in addition to a disruptive local
pirate problem_within the Gulf itself, the British role within
that body of water expanded during the 19th century. [Ref.
10 :p. 5] The main intent of British activities in the Gulf
was to ensure peace and stability in order to allow her
commercial activities to progress unencumbered- -a goal not
unlike Western desires today. [Ref. 8:p. 298]
To do this, Britain was forced initially to
demonstrate her military power on several occasions during the
first two decades of the 19th century. Following several
raids on local tribal entities in the lower Gulf, Britain
negotiated a number of agreements to suppress piracy, prevent
slave traffic curb arms smuggling and of course promote
peaceful trade. [Ref. 2:p. 655] In 1869, a treaty was
concluded with the shaykhdoms of the lower Gulf, known as the
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Trucial States, that established a de facto protectorate
relationship with Britain. The rulers agreed to allow Britain
to handle all external affairs and "undertook not to cede
territory or grant any concessions to powers and individuals
other than Britain." These two principles were formalized in
the exclusivity clause and the nonalienation clause. Similar
agreements were negotiated in 1880 and 1899 with Bahrain and
Kuwait, respectively. [Ref. 2:p. 655] As noted, the peace-
keeping consideration was the primary aim of the strategy.
Van Nieuwenhui j ze has commented, as have others, that "perhaps
an unintended result was a largely conservative impact so far
as internal affairs were concerned." [Ref. 8:p. 298]
At this point, British interest in the Gulf still
remained tied to the protection of her lines of communication
with India. With the dawn of the 20th century, and the
discovery of oil, the geopolitical position of the Gulf began
to shift. Gradually, the Gulf took on an intrinsic value of
its own and Britain, particularly following World War I,
became more deeply involved in the region. Clearly the impact
of British dominance in the region is considerable. The
specifics of that impact upon the political and social
development of its shaykhdoms will be examined later in this
chapter.
2 . Wahhabis and the Rise of the Saudis
The hinterland and western regions of the peninsula,
as noted earlier, were largely untouched by the competition
15
that European powers were increasingly waging in the Middle
East. There was, however, an internal movement whose
influence impacted critically upon the future of the
peninsula. In the 18th century, while the British and Dutch
were struggling for commercial dominance in the Gulf, there
arose from the Najd region in central Arabia, a puritanical
religious movement known as Wahhabism. Its founder, Muhammad
ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1787), teamed up with Muhammad ibn
Saud, the chieftain of a tiny village that received Abdul
Wahhab, and together spread the new doctrine and their
personal power. Having achieved the conquest of central and
eastern Arabia by the turn of the century, the family of Saud
began to encroach upon Ottoman territory in Iraq and in the
Hijaz. The Ottoman Porte, disturbed by the success of this
fundamentalist movement, dispatched Egyptian Sultan, Muhammad
Ali, to crush the upstart family. Following a decade of
campaigning, the power of the Saud family was reduced and
remained dormant for nearly a century.
In 1901, Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, son of the exiled family
leader, took up the banner of Wahhabism and reconquered
Riyadh. By 1913, he had consolidated control over the Nejd
and the al Hasa region of the peninsula in the east . During
World War I, ibn Saud agreed with the British to remain
neutral and not attack the Hashemite clan in the Hijaz, which
was revolting against the Ottomans with British assistance.
[Ref. 2:p. 574] Following the war, however, longstanding
16
tensions between the two clans erupted, resulting in sporadic
warfare that lasted for five years and ended with the Saud
conquest of the Hijaz, including the holy cities of Mecca and
Medina. The final militant expansion of the Sauds ended in
1934 with the conquest of Asir, just north of Yemen. This
marked what essentially represents the borders of present-day
Saudi Arabia.
3 . Oil
The discovery of oil in the beginning of the century
coincided with increasing European involvement in the Middle
East and gradually overwhelmed all other strategic interests
in terms of importance. For the traditional societies of the
Arabian Peninsula, this new-found resource meant the sudden
and tremendous acquisition of wealth. With this wealth,
however, came the increased penetration of the West with all
its social, political and ideological baggage that further
aggravated and accelerated the disrupting process of
modernization. For the very conservative Saudi Arabian
society that had for centuries existed untouched by the
outside world, the experience was bound to be dynamic and
potentially destabilizing.
Bahrain was the first Gulf entity to begin producing
and exporting oil in the 1930s. It was not until after World
War II, however, that the Gulf nations and Saudi Arabia began
to produce in earnest. [Ref. 11 :p. 318] In addition to the
effects that oil had upon these young nations as developing
17
and modernizing societies, the advent of oil in the Gulf
region ushered in the United States for the first time in
Middle Eastern history. American oil companies obtained
concessions early in both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, sometimes
to the chagrin of the British overlords. [Ref. 2:p. 670] The
relationship that developed between these companies and their
host governments- -particularly Saudi Arabia- -gradually evolved
into increased American government interest in the region,
ultimately, of course, replacing Great Britain as the
preeminent power.
This brief history of the Arabian peninsula suggests
an area, prior to the turn of this century, relatively
isolated from external influences- -particularly the interior.
Even the protectorate system instituted by the British in the
19th century interfered little with the traditional way of
life along the Persian Gulf littoral. Indeed, it served to
conserve rather than alter these societies. These societies
were also relatively unprepared socially or politically to
tackle the problems associated with the penetration of the
West at the turn of the century.
B. TRADITIONAL SOCIETY IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA
Several generalizations can be made about the basic
societal and political structure that characterized
traditional society in the Arabian peninsula. This framework
18
is important because this structure is deeply ingrained in the
cultural tradition that has remained relatively unchanged for
centuries prior to the introduction of modernization in the
20th century.
1 . The Family
The basic social unit in traditional Middle Eastern
society is the extended family, not the individual. Van
Nieuwenhui j ze notes that "to the Middle Eastern perception of
what is a social unit and of how units interrelate, the family
is the base line rather than the individual persons who are
its physical constituents." [Ref. 8:p. 381] Van
Nieuwenhui j ze goes on to explain three considerations of this
concept that impact upon the basic operation and structure of
the family.
First, marriage in traditional societies is primarily
and mainly a family affair. Rather than the joining of two
individuals, the importance of the event lies in the
continuity of the family. "Think of the institutionalization
of marriage arrangements and rituals, in which bride and groom
are basically passive up to, or even including, the moment of
giving their consent." [Ref. 8:p. 385] Indeed, marriage was
and is often used for political purposes. The second
consideration is that women generally count for less than men.
This is seen in the "emphatically patriarchical " nature of
families. This male dominance as head of the family also
translates to society as a whole. "Operationally speaking,
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the family father is the fountain-head of authority and
decisionmaking. In this regard, he can be depicted as
embodying the family in respect of society at large". [Ref
.
8:p. 386] Finally, the traditional family is extended, not
nuclear. The extended family acts in many ways as a self-
contained social unit that attends to all the needs of its
members
.
The family father together with his wife... or wives
shares the home with his male and unmarried female
children and the wives and children of his sons.
Traditional life expectations being what they are,
this normally results in three generations living
together in a compound home. In addition to being a
biological complex, the family is several other things
too. It is an economic unit, for production as well
as consumption purposes and also for the processing
that links the two together. The self-supporting
family has only limited needs that must be met from
outside. Subsistence ... is a decisive factor in this
connection. Internally, the family is also a unit in
terms of authority-wielding: the base line of
sociopolitical powers. [Ref. 8:p. 386]
In a culture that places the family above the
individual, men above women, and the family as the base line
unit socially and economically, it is not difficult to imagine
what concepts such as democracy- -which emphasizes the
individual- -and modernization- -which radically alters the
economic environment- -may do to the basic socioeconomic
structure of the society.
2 . The Tribe
If the family forms the basic traditional social unit
of the Arabian peninsula, then the tribe serves as the basic
political unit. The tribal segment of the Arabian peninsula
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has traditionally dominated the society socially, economically
and politically. The tribes were typically united through
tribal alliances that transcended independent regions or
states. [Ref. 12 :p. 432] Although trial society exists in
both urban and nomadic communities (this is particularly true
of the Persian Gulf region), it "is at its 'purist' not in the
city or village, but amongst pastoral nomads of mountain and
desert." The very nature of nomadic wanderings, combined with
the vast array of tribal alliances prevalent throughout the
peninsula, suggests that the concept of territoriality in the
Western sense would be completely alien to this society.
[Ref. 8:pp. 395-397.]
Power, in traditional tribal society, is decentra-
lized, has limited central authority and is egalitarian in
nature. [Ref. 13 :p. 6] The traditional foundations of the
legitimacy of ruling families within a tribe are based on
concepts of power-sharing and Islam as represented in the
Sharia (Islamic Law). [Ref. 13:p. 8] Two sociopolitical
tribal customs derive from this decentralized, egalitarian
philosophy, and are important in understanding the manner in
which Gulf rulers today try to couple traditional principles
with democratic concepts. The first is the idea of public
session, or ma j lis. Theoretically, any individual citizen is
granted personal access to the ruler and has the opportunity
for immediate redress of his grievance. Consultation, or
shura, is the second concept which requires the ruler to
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consult with community leaders to reach a consensus prior to
acting on a particular issue. [Ref. 14 :p. 299]
Finally, the tribally-organized segment of society has
maintained control over major economic resources such as
pearls, dates, or presently oil. [Ref. 12 :p. 432] With
respect to wealth in general, the identity of ruler and ruled
was such that traditionally "their wealth is his and vice
versa." There was, in effect, a lack of distinction between
the ruler's funds and the public coffers. [Ref. 8:p. 289]
3 . Kinship
It should come as no surprise that in a society which
revolves around the family, loyalty to ancestry and the
importance of blood relations generally come above all else.
Kinship in the traditional society of the Arabian peninsula is
the construct which defines social relationships both within
the family and the tribe, and means above all that these
relationships are highly personalized. "Kinship links
individuals in a family, it is the means to conceptualize
social patterns and relationships." [Ref. 8:p. 382] The
tribal society "is the kind of society where social structure
is primarily and consistently envisaged in terms of kinship."
[Ref. 8:p. 399] Indeed, kinship permeates all aspects of
tribal relations. "Tribesmen. . .manipulate kinship principles
to regulate marriage, social interaction, and the redistribu-
tion of power, force, wealth, and benefits." [Ref. 12 :p. 432]
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If kinship dominates social and political relations
within the traditional society, then the idea of a state in
the Western sense (which involves the institutionalized
control over men with whom one has no ties of kinship)
,
is
alien to this society. "A tribe was organized by lines and
obligations of blood. In its patriarchal egalitarianism, it
required no institutions of state." [Ref. 15 :p. 12]
4 . Islam
Kinship is not the only means of defining social and
political relationships in the traditional society. Islam, as
a religion, has predominated in the Middle East since its rise
in the 7th century. Some have suggested this was in part a
reaction to the decadence of tribal society. [Ref. 8:p. 462]
Where kinship defines relations within tribes and families,
Islam offers something similar, but goes beyond mere groups to
a larger Community of Believers (umma) . In its ideal, "Islam
designates ... not only a religion but also a community and a
way of life." [Ref. 15 :p. 5] The ideal "way of life" is
expressed through the Shari'a. The Shari'a is a comprehensive
system of morality which evolved from the Quran and hadith
(practices of the Prophet) . As the statement of God's will,
it is supreme in all aspects of society, and, in principle,
removes the realm of legislation from the competence of the
ruler. [Ref. 16 :p. 5] In other words, in its revealed form,
it represents a perfect system of political and societal
organization.
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Islam and the Community of Believers (umma) can be
seen as an attempt to supersede pre-Islamic units, such as the
tribe. While it failed in displacing traditional societal
units of living, it was successful in superimposing these
units. [Ref. 8:p. 462]
The great majority who became Muslims in Muhammad's
lifetime and thereafter. . .were not individual converts
but families and tribes who made the decision to join
the larger community of Islam on the basis of their
own customary solidarity. Alongside the demand for
the unity of all Believers, there were... these other
organized and competing claims for loyalty." [Ref.
15:p. 6]
The rise of the Ummayad tribe (a tribe from Mecca that had
opposed Muhammad and his message initially) to assume the
Caliphate and establish the first Islamic dynasty, illustrates
this point. By placing
. . .all loyalties and relationships under the authority
of one God, Islam reinforced a more ancient test of
political legitimacy- -the ruler's ability to protect
the moral and physical integrity of the Middle East's
most immediate and enduring community- -the kinship
group. [Ref. 15:p. 14]
For the first two centuries following the death of
Muhammad in 632 A.D., the ulama (religious scholars), using
reasoned interpretations (ijtihad) of the Quran and hadith as
well as consensus (ijma) , were able to form a body of law that
was adaptable to various aspects of society not specifically
addressed by Muhammad. This process gave Islam a flexibility
that would allow it to adapt and evolve with the changing
requirements of life. In the 10th century, however, fearful
that the spirit of the corpus of law was being corrupted by
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the growth of sectarian movements, regional dynasties and
philosophical speculations, the ulama closed the gate to
individual interpretation of the Shari'a, effectively
stagnating Islam's ability to grow and adapt with time.
"Islamic society thus lingered basically unchanged until the
19th century, and was especially unprepared to meet the
challenge of the modern age." [Ref. 15 :p. 34]
Prior to the establishment of the Ottoman Empire in
the 16th century, Islamic history was characterized by the
rise and fall of various Islamic dynasties. From this pattern
there developed a relationship between the ruler and ulama
that essentially ensured the survival of each, but further
served to cement Islam in the 10th century. For the ulama, it
was a choice between anarchy and the acknowledgment of the
existing authority, of which they chose the latter in the
interest of the greater good. In doing so, however, they
joined into a partnership with political authority, lending
ideological legitimacy to often tyrannical and rather un-
Islamic regimes. [Ref. 15 :p. 17] The result was a societal
and political system that legitimized authority of the status
quo and was ill -prepared to flex and adapt to the dynamic
challenges of Western penetration and modernization.
In orthodox Islam, the believer has been given rules
to guide his entire conduct by a God so powerful that
only submission is possible. In his immediate social
world, loyalty to family ideally reigned supreme over
truth or self in any judgment. In response to tyranny
and anarchy in the political realm, bending with the
wind became the habit of survival. [Ref. 15 :p. 220]
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Within the community of Islam, there have been many-
sectarian divisions throughout history. The most significant
in the Peninsula, and Middle East in general, is the Sunni-
Shi ' a schism. The origin of the split lies in a political
dispute over succession to the Prophet but ultimately evolved
into disagreements over doctrine, law and custom. [Ref . 16 :p.
3] The Sunnis (orthodox) represent the vast majority of Mus-
lims worldwide (about 90 percent) and in the context of the
Middle East dominate the Arab nations including the Arabian
peninsula. The Shi 'is, on the other hand, constitute about
ten percent of all Muslims and for historic reasons, reside
primarily in Iran. However, there is a slight Shi 'a majority
in Iraq and significant communities can be found in Lebanon
and along the western coast of the Persian Gulf. In fact,
considerable percentages of the population in Kuwait, Bahrain,
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are Shi' a. [Ref. 17 .-p. xvi]
Historically, conflict between the two sects has often
been bitter, and religious ideology has been adopted often in
pursuit of geopolitical aims. The numerous wars between the
Ottoman Empire and the Persian Safavid Empire in the 16th
century, as well as the most recent Iran-Iraq war, can be
viewed in some ways as a Sunni-Shi'i confrontation. Further,
Shia tradition is replete with a history of repression and
persecution at the hands of Sunni caliphs. Indeed, the Shia
experience in Sunni lands, including the Arabian peninsula,
has reinforced this persecuted outlook. Notwithstanding this,
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however, it is important to note that there also exists a
sense of community between the Sunnis and Shi 'is that is
"based on the profound conviction of Muslims that to live
together in unity" they must be able to see past doctrinal
disputes. [Ref. 16 :p. 4] This is particularly true when
Muslims face threats from outside their community.
Finally, any discussion on religion in traditional
Arabia must include a brief note on the Wahhabis of Saudi
Arabia. As noted earlier, this fundamentalist brand of Islam
emerged from the hinterland of the Nejd region in the Arabian
peninsula in the late 18th century. These "unitarians"
adhered strictly to a rigid doctrine that rejected all innova-
tions introduced into Islam after the closing of the ijtihad
in the 10th century. Intolerant and extremist, this militant
form of Islam attacked all those, including other orthodox
Sunnis, who did not subscribe to their beliefs. [Ref. 18:pp.
229-231.] Shi' is in particular have historically been a
favorite target of Wahhabi ferocity. [Ref. 19 :p. 77]
The clear success of the Saud-Wahhab alliance can be
attributed to the nature of the relationship. The Wahhabi
movement provided the Sauds with an ideology that raised their
political position clearly above that of competing tribes.
Exclusive and tributary in nature, the Sauds were able to form
a structure that established an absolute monopoly of power for
their family at the expense of other tribes and families.
While this diminished the political position of these excluded
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families, their social position was maintained through tri-
bute, thus allowing the Sauds to retain a traditional desert
alliance that further enhanced their legitimacy as absolute
rulers. [Ref. 19:pp. 76-85] This structure essentially
remains in place today.
Traditional society in the Arabian peninsula can be
characterized as a conservative tribally and family-based
structure . The two main systems that provide a framework for
both political and social relationships are clearly kinship
and religion. Given the conservative and isolated nature of
the Arabian peninsula throughout history, it is not surprising
that a traditional fundamentalist movement such as Wahhabism
could survive, and indeed, thrive in such a society. How this
society, and the other monarchical societies of the Persian
Gulf deal with the challenges of modernization will be dealt
with in the next chapter. Before examining this question,
however, it is useful to review some general theories on
transitioning societies.
C. MODERNIZATION
Modernization, as the term implies, is the transition of
a traditional society to a new, "modern" society. Monte
Palmer, in his work on political development, characterizes
traditional societies as being "family-based barter economies
. . .which seldom provide goods and services beyond the level of
bare subsistence." Their political systems are dominated by
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"family-based tribal chief tains .. .who perform all necessary
political functions." Traditional cultures, such as religion
and tradition, "justify established social, economic, and
political patterns ... and reinforce the perpetuation of the
traditional social order by stressing values of passivity,
fatalism and conformity." [Ref. 20 :p. 43]
Modern societies, Palmer continues, have "highly differen-
tiated industrial economies which. .. create surplus of goods
and services sufficient to provide most members of society
with a standard of living well in excess of mere subsistence."
The political systems are "differentiated organizational
structures" that perform all political functions, "including
the articulation of mass demands, rule making, rule
administration, and rule adjudication." Modern cultural
systems use "ideological appeals to democracy, communism, or
national destiny" to justify established patterns and stress
"values of political participation, achievement, creativity,"
etc. Of particular concern to this study, Palmer observes
that "mass political participation in traditional societies is
minimal, mass participation in modern societies is intense."
[Ref. 20:p. 43]
The impetus for this change and desire to transition from
a traditional, secure and stable society to an unknown,
disruptive, modern society is caused primarily by external
factors. In our case, the penetration of the West first for
strategic than economic reasons, in the 20th century was the
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major catalyst for the disruption of the traditional,
relatively isolated societies that had existed for centuries
oblivious of the changes swirling about them. Two world wars,
oil and the tremendous technological advances in communica-
tions all contributed to the introduction of disrupting
factors into these societies. The increasing presence of
foreigners in the Arabian peninsula, whether businessmen,
military advisors or educators, accelerated the spread of new
ideas about politics, religion and economics. At the same
time, oil had created an industrial segment of society that
required sources of labor, resources and administration, not
to mention the tremendous wealth that accompanied these other
changes. The principle aspects of modernization created by
this invasion of foreign influences include urbanization,
industrialization, secularization, democratization, education
and media participation. [Ref. 7:p. 32] In the Arabian
peninsula, these aspects have proceeded along at varying
speeds and in some cases may be only barely apparent . The
important thing is that these are the types of transforma-
tions that characterize a modernizing society. It is also
significant to note that these same revolutions were
experienced by the West but took place over four or five
centuries. When one considers that this process in the
Arabian peninsula has only been underway for six or seven
decades, the magnitude of the problems and instability
associated with it begins to become apparent.
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The traditional society in our case was described above
and characterized as being a relatively fixed political and
societal structure with its relationships being defined
through kinship and religion. In such a world, the individual
is most often resigned to his place in the society believing,
fatefully, that he has no ability to affect change. In a
modern world, or at least a modernizing one, the individual
begins to feel a political consciousness of his own and
believes that he may in fact be able to influence change.
Samuel Huntington has noted that "Traditional man expected
continuity in nature and society and did not believe in the
capacity of man to change or control either. Modern man, in
contrast, accepts the possibility of change and believes in
its desirability." [Ref. 7:p. 32]
Essentially, the individual is becoming politicized, or
socially mobilized. Karl Deutsch defined social mobilization
"as the process in which major clusters of old social,
economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken
and people become available for new patterns of socialization
and behavior." [Ref. 21 :p. 493] The social "rules" that
dictated social and political behavior in the traditional
society are being challenged by both individuals and groups
whose lives have been turned upside down by modernization.
For instance, the whole idea of democracy, with its emphasis
on the individual, undermines the position of the family as
the primary social unit, and the tribe as the primary
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political unit in traditional- society. Contemporary social
change "will enhance, indeed widen, the occurrence of
individualism, at the expense of group-belongingness . " [Ref.
8:p. 384] Kinship, as a defining rule of behavior, would
theoretically suffer as well. As the loyalty to family or
tribe begins to diminish, "it is likely that those ... having
gone through something like an individualization process, may
prove more readily amenable" to give loyalty to a cause, than
"those who remain within the traditional shelter of the
extended family." [Ref. 8:p. 394] Thus, a situation develops
where increasingly more people become available for political
mobilization
.
At the same time, the spread of information through a more
active and expanded media, as well as foreign businessmen,
educators and politicians, creates greater awareness of an
individual's position relative to others in the society.
Expectations are raised as traditional man becomes conscious
of the vast improvements in his condition that can be achieved
in the modern world. Consequently, when these expectations
are not met, the individual begins to seek other means to
improve his condition in society, be it economically,
politically or socially.
Social groups and economic classes, both old and new, will
similarly experience raised expectations and will be
vulnerable to the appeal of various ideological movements that
seek to improve or maintain their respective positions in
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society. As Huntington notes, "modernization creates new
social groups and new social and political consciousness in
old groups." [Ref. 7:p. 167] These politically conscious
groups and individuals promoting their own parochial interests
and infused with new ideologies, will invariably demand an
increased say in the governing of society. If the political
system cannot be expanded to assimilate these groups into
society, they present disruptive and destabilizing elements in
the modernizing process. Indeed, if they are considered by
the existing system as illegitimate, then they may feel no
other choice than to question the legitimacy of the ruling
regime and seek its overthrow. It is the challenge of
expanding power in the system to assimilate newly mobilized
groups that is the primary concern of modernizing nations.
[Ref. 7:p. 146]
In the Middle East, the two most prominent ideologies that
have attracted various groups, both assimilated and not
assimilated in the 10th century, are nationalism and
Islamicism. Nationalism, both Pan-Arab and particularist , has
been most useful for competing groups to use during the
modernization process to garner support and further interests.
A Western concept, nationalism has a populist appeal to those
trying to deal with the disruption, upheaval and anxiety that
is created by the societal transformation. Ernest Gellner, in
Nations and Nationalism , explains that,
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...as the tidal wave of modernization sweeps the
world, it makes sure that almost everyone ... has cause
to feel unjustly treated, and that he can identify the
culprits as being of another 'nation.' If he can also
identify enough of the victims as being of the same
'nation' as himself, a nationalism is born. [Ref.
22:p. 112]
Further, it is vague and flexible enough to incorporate a wide
variety of economic or political programs. E.J. Hobsbawm
notes that nationalism's "very vagueness and lack of
programmatic content gives it a potentially universal support
within its community." [Ref. 23 :p. 169] Manfred Halpern
similarly argues that nationalism is popular because it makes
few specific demands on its adherents. "Nationalism can
assert itself without at the same time demanding loyalty to
any particular form of government or society, economic
organization or values, or any particular religious belief."
[Ref. 15 :p. 207]
World War I and its aftermath witnessed the emergence of
Arab nationalism from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. In
most cases its political and intellectual leaders had adopted
it as a means to further or maintain their own interests. The
populist appeal described above enabled these leaders to
mobilize significant mass support for their cause. The Arab
Revolt in the Hijaz in 1916 can be seen as a reaction to
increasing Ottoman centralizing policies that tended to
undermine the power and influence of Sharif Hussein and his
Hashemite clan. The adoption of nationalist ideology by
Hussein's sons, Faisal and Abdullah, in Iraq and Jordan, it
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has also been argued, was simply the best means in which to
maintain their own position. 1 Similarly, Arab notables in
greater Syria following the war used nationalist ideology,
both Pan Arabist and particularlist , in order to secure their
traditional hold on political power. 2 The rise of a new
middle class in the Middle East during the interwar period
resulted in the emergence of a more radical form of national-
ism that challenged the monarchical regimes in the 1950s and
saw the overthrow of those regimes in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and
Libya. Whether Nasserist or Ba'thist, these new, more radical
forms of Pan-Arab nationalism represented the ideological
vehicle of a new elite attempting to gain power and further
their own interests.
Throughout the history of Arab nationalism, the underly-
ing theme that predominates through all forms of the ideology
is a resistance to an alien power or culture, most often
colonialism and the West. Revolts in Iraq in the early 1920s,
Arab resistance to Jewish immigration in Palestine in the
1930s and the Egyptian revolution in 1952, just to mention a
few, occurred under the nominal aegis of anti-imperialism.
lSee essays by William Ochsenwald and Mary Wilson
(Chapters 9 and 10) in Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad
Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon, eds
.
, The Origins of Arab
Nationalism , New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.
2See Ernest C. Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays
on the Origins of Arab Nationalism , Durham: Duke University
Press, 1988; see also Muhammad Y. Muslih, The Origins of
Palestinian Nationalism , New York: Columbia University Press,
1988 .
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Anti- imperialism served as a powerful symbol to mobilize
popular support. The blows delivered to Arab nationalism
during the Arab Cold War and the devastating loss to Israel in
1967, saw the demise of Pan-Arabism as a viable ideology for
elites to use. Parallel to this, western origins and the
secular nature of nationalism came under increasing
intellectual attack. [Ref. 24:Chapter 1]
What nationalist ideology had failed to address was the
societal crisis of modernization that gave rise to the
challenge to Arab society in the first place. "The popular
classes that had been initiated into the supranational appeal
of pan-Arabism remained available for mobilization in the name
of revolutionary pan-Islam." [Ref. 25 :p. 508] Thus, in the
wake of the demise of Arab nationalism, a new ideology was
adopted. This ideology focused more acutely on the problems
associated with the penetration of the West into Middle
Eastern society, because it was based in the culture itself
and could justifiably claim it was the true answer to the
challenges posed by modernization and development. Rather
than an attack from the political Left, as the nationalist
ideologies had been, Islamicism came from the Right. In many
ways it is far more pervasive and dangerous for regimes
attempting to modernize because it questions the very founda-
tions of development based on Western political and economic
values. The themes,
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. . .the power of the foreigner in Muslim life, the
wicked ways of the privileged, the sanctity of the
disinherited who rise up to inherit the earth free
from the hold of oppressors, the right of Islam to
rule and to dispense with secular governments of the
monarchic and republican varieties... [Ref. 24:p. 11]
are explosive indeed.
Thus, throughout the modernizing process of the 20th
century, ideologies have been used by contending elites to
mobilize disaffected groups and individuals in order to
further or maintain influence and power in society. For the
developing regime, the problem is one of being able to
assimilate these new social groups into the political process.
If they are unable to do this, then they will face increasing
challenges to their legitimacy to rule the society. Also
noteworthy is the continuing theme of anti-imperialism that
pervades the adopted ideologies, whether Left or Right. This
fact has important implications for the regimes in power and
the manner in which Western nations deal with those regimes.
For the Arab monarchical regimes of the Arabian peninsula,
this problem is exacerbated because of their traditional basis
of legitimacy and the manner in which these regimes came to
power.
D. IMPACT OF COLONIALISM AND OIL
British imperialism and the discovery of oil in the 20th
century were the two major factors that broke the traditional
social and political structure of Arabian society. The
primary impact of these two developments was to concentrate
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power in the hands of a single ruling family and to undermine
the traditionally dispersed nature of power in the tribal
system. The result was the establishment of absolute
traditional monarchies in these Arab shaykhdoms . It should be
noted that while Saudi Arabia did not experience British
colonial influence, as did its counterparts on the Persian
Gulf, the impact of the Saud-Wahhabi movement, as described
previously, had a very similar effect in concentrating power
in the hands of a single family. The advent of oil wealth
subsequently served to consolidate the political positions of
all these ruling families.
In the 19th century, Britain became increasingly involved
in the Persian Gulf with the primary strategic goal of
protecting her lines of communication with the Indian empire.
A secondary interest in the region was trade. As threats to
these two interests intensified throughout the century,
Britain negotiated a series of bilateral treaties with local
rulers with the primary mission of maintaining peace as well
as protecting them from some outside aggressor. The treaties
deliberately restricted British interference in internal
affairs of the shaykhdoms, which resulted in a largely
conservative impact on development and a dampening effect on
social change. Some observers have suggested the negative
impact of such a policy.
Certainly the consequence of Britain's imperial
unconcern for internal affairs- -coupled, rather oddly
it may seem, with its insistence on excluding everyone
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else--was that the Gulf states were ill-prepared for
the almost simultaneous arrival of oil wealth and
independence. [Ref. 19:p. 157]
On the coast, numerous nuclear settlements had been
established in the past several centuries to take advantage of
the pearling and maritime resources of the Persian Gulf. From
these settlements began to emerge leading families who
governed their respective communities with the traditional
vigor and consensus required to maintain tribal support . The
British penetration and establishment of protectorates along
the Arab side of the Persian Gulf further enhanced the status
of the Tribal Shaykhs as being "responsible for all members of
their physical or tribal communities. ..." These protectorates
legalized the concept of "shaykhdom" as well as formalized the
British position vis-a-vis the Trucial Shaykhs. [Ref. 14:pp.
301-302]
The discovery of oil and rush by imperial powers,
primarily Britain, to obtain concessions to oil reserves in
the first several decades of this century served to further
consolidate the position of ruling families in the various
shaykhdoms . In a society with strong nomadic roots, there
existed no concept of land property or territorial boundaries.
When Western companies began to seek concessions in the Gulf
littoral, they naturally approached whomever they felt could
make an acceptable claim. In this case the ruling families of
these British protectorates seemed the most legitimate
authority with whom they could negotiate. "Granting of
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concessions by the Rulers was done under the assumption by
both parties that the Trucial Shakhs as a group held
sovereignty...." [Ref. 14 :p. 302]
Two important considerations emerged from this
development. First, the need to delineate boundaries became
apparent further enhancing the Rulers' status as state
sovereigns. This also led to border disputes between
neighboring Shaykhdoms, many of which remain today. Second,
and more significant, the revenues that began to come into the
country as oil production increased, went straight into the
pockets of the Rulers. The distinction between the public
coffers and personal wealth was grey indeed. This of course
provided the Rulers with a means to increase their hold on
power and consolidate their internal position. "This more or
less personal payment ... tends to strengthen their economic,
and consequently their political position beyond all
proportion." [Ref. 8:p. 298] The Rulers strengthened their
internal position initially by subsidizing tribal notables
(especially in Saudi Arabia) and then increasingly ensuring
stability through formalized generosity, which of course leads
to welfare states.
Ultimately what this concentration of authority into one
family resulted in was the erosion of tribal society in the
traditional sense. Only the ruling family continues to play
an important political role in the Gulf shaykhdoms. Other
tribal families have generally been able to retain influence
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only by moving into other fields such as commerce or industry.
Also contributing were other aspects of modernization such as
urbanization and the exodus of many tribesmen from the
interior to the nuclear settlements. [Ref. 14 :p. 312]
Moreover, the ruling family became increasingly exclusive and
solitary in order to maintain control over an expanding
bureaucracy. Greater exclusiveness has led to a "preeminence
of kinship as an instrument of corporation and distribution of
wealth, power, and benefits." Increased authority for the
ruling family meant decreased influence for other tribal
groups. [Ref. 12:pp. 440-442] Ultimately, what has emerged
are absolute monarchies- -perhaps the last true monarchies
surviving- -that are family-based, very exclusive and with whom
kinship retains its preeminent role in both political and
economic fields.
E. THE TRADITIONAL MONARCHY AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
For the traditional absolute monarch, the problems of
modernization and the assimilation of newly emerging social
groups and both new and old groups that have become
politically conscious, is particularly difficult. As
discussed above, modernization requires reform of the
political system. In order to bring about this reform, power
must be concentrated to overcome traditional forms of
opposition to the modernization. As we have seen, historical
factors of oil and colonialism have contributed significantly
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to the concentration of power in the Arabian polities. The
process of reform, however, releases forces which increasing-
ly challenge this concentration of power and demand that the
system be expanded to allow their participation. Samuel
Huntington notes that the
...concentration of power was necessary to promote
social, cultural, and economic reform while this
centralization made it difficult or impossible to
expand power of the traditional polity and assimilate
into it new groups produced by modernization. [Ref.
7:p. 177]
For the absolute monarchies- -of which Huntington describes
Saudi Arabia as being the best model- -there is an even greater
impetus to reform in the 20th century when compared to less
traditional developing regimes. This is due to the
traditional basis of their claim to legitimacy, which in a
modernizing world filled with ideas of democracy, liberalism
and socialism is extremely vulnerable to challenges from
various elements of society. The most important considera-
tion for reform and modernization among traditional monarchies
today has been the
...recognition of the need for modernization for
domestic reasons. The principal threat to the
stability of a traditional society comes not from
invasion by foreign armies but from invasion by
foreign ideas.... The stability of twentieth century
traditional monarchies is endangered from within
rather than from without. [Ref. 7:p. 155]
The modernizing monarch must try to maintain the viability
of his traditional legitimacy while changing his society.
Traditional forces that feel threatened by the King's
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modernizing policies will oppose him on the basis that he is
moving too fast and undermining the fabric of the society,
particularly given the influx of foreign ideas. Modern forces
and newly emerging social groups, while approving of his
modernizing tendencies, will claim he is not moving fast
enough. Further, they will question the legitimacy of a
traditional monarchy which continues to maintain its strict
monopoly on political power. If the monarch does expand power
to allow contending groups to participate in the system, the
two diametrically opposed forces- -traditionalists and modern-
ists- -will ultimately slow the developing efforts of the
monarch. The result normally is the abolishment of participa-
tory institutions by the monarch when he feels his power
declining. Since the institutional nature of the monarchy is
unable to expand power in the system, Huntington contends, the
traditional polity is "able to transform the society, " but it
is "unable to transform itself." In the end, he warns, "the
monarchial parent is eventually devoured by its modern
progeny." [Ref. 7:p. 169]
The modernizing monarch will normally be forced to insti-
tute his reform measures by maintaining the centralization of
power, and repressing opposition elements. "Both reform and
repression are aspects of the centralization of power and the
failure to expand political participation. Their logical
result is revolt or revolution." [Ref. 7:pp. 190-191] While
there are often forces in society that the monarch can draw
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upon for support, such as the bureaucracy or masses, often,
traditional monarchies rely heavily on foreign governments.
Huntington demonstrates the peril involved in such a reliance.
Support from external sources, however, endangers the
ability of the monarch to capitalize on what in the
long-run may be the most potent sentiments among all
groups in the society, the sentiments of nationalism
[read anti-imperialism] . . .those monarchs perish who
remain more committed to traditional values, class
perspectives, and family interests than to national
ones. [Ref. 7:p. 165]
For the ruling families of the Arabian peninsula this
assertion has clear implications.
Huntington's final assessment of the ability of
traditional monarchies to make a stable transition from
traditional to modern society is bleak. Indeed, writing in
the 1960s, he specifically uses six Middle Eastern monarchies
as examples. Of those six today, four have experienced
violent overthrows. [Ref. 7:p. 191]
The preceding has demonstrated the particular problems
associated with the modernization of the traditional Arabian
society. The concentration of power in the past century of
these polities in the hands of single-ruling families has
rendered them particularly vulnerable to the competing
interests of new social groups and forces released by the
process of modernization. If these families, still relying on
traditional bonds of kinship and religion, continue to exclude
these new groups from power, their situation will only get
worse. The next chapter will examine efforts in the Gulf
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regimes to expand political participation within their
societies, the emergence of new groups and the impact of
regional ideologies on these efforts and stability.
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III. THE ARAB GULF STATES
Social change has also become a major influence, and
often the decisive factor, in the regional and
international relations of the Middle East. The main
threats to stability and peace in the area today stem
from domestic and regional conflicts produced or
exacerbated by the uprooting of the entire structure
of society. The greatest danger, internationally, is
not open aggression initiated from abroad but covert
foreign intervention in internal political warfare
initiated by Middle Easterners. [Ref. 15:p. 350]
The primary aim of the ruling families of the six Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) states is basically the same for
each polity. This goal has been "to promote wide-ranging
economic development while simultaneously attempting to
preserve the traditional nature of society and, by implica-
tion, the traditional political structure." [Ref. 13 :p. 3]
The preceding chapter discussed the inherent problems
associated with this objective and focused, in particular, on
the ability for an absolute monarch to transition the society
through modernization while maintaining a monopoly on
political power. This chapter will examine specific efforts
by the GCC states to establish political institutions which
will expand political participation and assimilate various
social groups into the society. It will also discuss some
details on these groups and their current condition. As was
alluded to in the previous chapter, if the ruling regimes in
the Gulf continue to maintain their absolute hold on political
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power, they will face an increasing, politically active,
populous vulnerable to mobilization by ideologies that focus
on symbols of tradition and anti-imperialism. This chapter
will conclude on a discussion of these ideologies-
-
specifically nationalism and Islamicism.
A. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
In order to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the popula-
tions of these Gulf states, rulers must increasingly walk a
tightrope between the traditionalists (often represented by
religious forces) and the modernists. What results is "a
fusion of traditional and new 'rationalist' elements." [Ref.
13 :p. 7]
Gulf rulers have made an effort to link or translate the
old concepts of tribal rule, based on decentralized power
sharing and consultation, to more modern concepts of democracy
and representative government. Majlis, or public session, as
discussed earlier, was a tribal concept that allowed an indi-
vidual in a tribe access to the ruler to address grievances.
Shura is an Islamic practice that established the requirement
for rulers to consult with community leaders on various deci-
sions of importance. A combination of these two is claimed by
many as the traditional tribal version of modern democracy.
Thus, consultative bodies established by Gulf regimes are
often bestowed the name majlis al-shura. However, this
idealized notion of the past and present represents more of a
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political mythology than reality. What minimal tribal egali-
tarianism existed in traditional society (nominal at best)
prior to modernization, was completely wiped away by the
impact of British colonialism, the Wahhabi-Saud movement and
oil. Instead, the divisions between the rulers and the ruled
increased. This "mythology" of tribal democracy is just that,
mythology. [Ref. 13:pp. 15-16]
This attempt to fuse traditional and modern concepts of
"democracy" has been made in most of the Gulf polities.
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) all
have written constitutions in which sovereignty resides in the
people. However, absolute power still remains in the hands of
the ruler. In Saudi Arabia, King Fahd announced the
establishment of a written constitution in March 1992 through
three royal decrees that explicitly state all changes are
based on the Koran and Sharia. Since 1932, Saudi Arabia has
maintained that its constitution was the Sharia alone. This
"new" constitution does incorporate the western concept of a
bill of rights and establishes, for the first time in the
Kingdom, a consultative national assembly. As with the other
GCC nations, however, the ruling family essentially retains
absolute power. [Ref. 26]
As alluded to above, Gulf regimes have experimented, to
very limited degrees, with representative bodies or national
assemblies, using the idea of establishing political institu-
tions that will allow for greater participation. What has
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emerged are institutions which appear more symbolic than
substantive. The two regimes that have come closest to
establishing an elected, representative assembly are Kuwait
and Bahrain. Qatar, UAE and Oman all have consultative
assemblies. The members to these assemblies are appointed by
the ruler, no political parties are permitted, and while they
are granted legislative review, they have no power to over-
ride a veto from the ruler. In a sense they are representa-
tive of the concept of shura by providing a forum for debate,
but all the key decisions are made by the rulers. All three
are currently functioning.
Saudi Arabia, although giving the concept of a national
council lip service for many years, has only recently estab-
lished such a body. Indeed, as early as 1962, Faisal as crown
prince, called for a majlis shura and in the early 1980s, King
Fahd gave the concept serious discussion indicating it was
merely a matter of time. However, the decision was consis-
tently procrastinated.
It was a case of recognizing in principle the need for
some structural change as a "safety valve" in order to
meet internal and external pressures, yet fearing that
once the Pandora's box of change was even slightly
opened it would be difficult to prevent wholesale
political transformation of the state. [Ref . 5:p. 59]
Reacting to the agitation that accompanied the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait in August 1990, King Fahd finally pledged to create
such a body in September of that same year. [Ref. 27 :p. 11]
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The royal decrees 1 establishing individual rights and the
first semblance of a constitution beyond the Sharia, also
announced the institution of a Consultative Council. As with
the three regimes of the lower Gulf, this council is not an
electoral body, and all 60 sixty members are appointed by the
King. It will have the right to initiate legislation and
review all foreign and domestic policies, as well as call in
cabinet ministers for questioning. The King, however, retains
the right to dissolve the Council at any time and appoint new
members. [Ref. 26] While this move does expand public
participation in government, it is only a slight advance in
that direction. Further, just three weeks following the
announcement, King Fahd, in a published interview, stated very
explicitly that he ruled out free elections for his country
based on Western democratic practices and reiterated the
preeminent position of the Koran as the ultimate source of law
and behavior in society. "The democratic system prevailing in
the world does not suit us in the region. . .Islam is our social
and political law... and is a complete constitution of social
and economic laws and a system of government and justice."
Some observers suggested that this statement was made in
response to the religious Right's reservations about the royal
decrees as well as a warning to the other Arab Gulf regimes
not to carry their democratic experiments too far. [Ref. 28]
1For the full text of royal decrees, see FBIS-NES, 2 March
1992, pp. 24-36.
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Thus, while these regimes recognize the need to expand
participation (to a limited extent on Western models) in order
to meet the demands of an increasingly Western-oriented
technocratic middle and upper class, they clearly understand
the need to maintain traditional pillars of legitimacy. For
the Saudi regime, this is particularly critical given the
historic alliance with the Wahhabi religious movement and the
ulama (religious scholars) in the country.
As mentioned, Kuwait and Bahrain are the only two regimes
that have made sincere efforts to establish representative,
elected assemblies that would allow for a real expansion of
power to assimilate social groups into the political process.
This is probably due to their longer exposure to oil-inspired
socioeconomic change as well as the influence of, and reaction
to, British colonialism. Both Shaykdoms have had an early
history of political demands for greater participation by a
generally urbanized population. The year 1938 witnessed
extensive reform movements in both polities as well as Dubai
in the lower gulf.
However, their experiments with representative political
institutions have been generally short-lived, ending normally
when there appears a real challenge to the power of the ruling
regime. In Bahrain, for instance, a National Assembly was
formed in 1973 following the Shaykdom's official independence
from Britain. The 30 seats in the assembly were elected by
about 29,000 voters and, although no parties were allowed,
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"blocs" could be identified within the assembly. The popular
bloc consisted of candidates who considered themselves
leftists, nationalist and reformists. They held eight seats.
The conservative bloc was made up of Shia candidates who had
won six seats. The remaining 16 were generally independent
and ideologically diverse. Although the assembly was not
allowed to draft laws, it attempted to challenge the govern-
ment on a security law that the amir had sought to enact in
the wake of labor riots that had occurred in June and January
of 1974. The diametrically opposed popular and conservative
blocs came together and gathered both assembly and public
support for their demands that the government submit the
proposed law to the National Assembly for debate and approval.
Sensing defeat, the amir dissolved the National Assembly in
August 1975 and suspended the constitutional article requiring
new elections. [Ref. 13: Chapter 3]
While there were allegations that the Saudis, as well as
Iranians and Americans, had pressured the amir to dissolve the
assembly,
... it was clear from the beginning that many in the Al
Khalifa (ruling family of Bahrain) saw the National
Assembly as a necessary appendage of a modern state
but sought to describe it in terms of extension of
shura, rather than popular participation in policy-
making. [Ref. 13 :p. 77]
When that "appendage" began to challenge the government, they
dissolved it. Writing at the end of the 1980s, J.E.
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Peterson, commented on the prospects for reinstitution of the
assembly:
Although there has been steady popular sympathy for
the reconstruction of the assembly, such support has
not as yet intensified into a demand, and the
government, bolstered by the opposition of a number of
prominent members of the ruling family, has seen fit
to leave the issue in abeyance indefinitely. [Ref.
13:p. 62]
Facing the same democratic pressures that the Saudis faced for
political reforms in the wake of the Iraqi invasion, Bahrain
has indicated intentions to restore her national council as
well, and rumors have flourished recently that suggests the
formation of such a body by the end of the year. [Ref. 13 :p.
77] Whether this occurs remains to be seen.
Kuwait has a longer history of experimentation in
electoral politics. In 1921 and 1938, consultative councils
were formed in response to political disruptions to provide a
safety valve for discontent. These initial attempts, however,
lasted only a short time, generally until their activities
began to impinge upon the actions of the ruling family. After
Kuwait gained its independence in 1961, the Amir, Abdullah al-
Salim, made the bold decision to institute a parliament. This
first elected National Assembly consisted of 50 members
elected by secret ballot. Laws could be promulgated after
being passed by the assembly and sanctioned by the amir, and
the assembly could override the ruler's veto by a two-thirds
majority. Further, the assembly had a no-confidence
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voting power over individual cabinet members but could not
apply that to the prime minister or the cabinet as a whole.
In the first 14 years of its existence, the assembly was
active and became an effective forum for criticism of govern-
ment policy. From 1963 to 1967, the opposition bloc of
liberal nationalists (generally emerging from the middle
class) were able to keep some pressure on the government.
However, the second assembly (1967-1971) saw a tremendous
decrease in nationalist influence based on the Arab defeat
(and Nasserism) in the 1967 war against Israel. This assembly
was dominated by pro-government and conservative (Islamic)
members. The early 1970s witnessed a reemergence of the
nationalists and, by the 1975 elections, almost half the
assembly consisted of less conservative, better educated
members. Responding to increasing and active government
opposition in both the assembly and Kuwait's fairly vigorous
press, the amir dissolved the assembly and restricted the
press in August 1976. At the same time, he suspended many
constitutional articles, including that which required new
elections within two months of dissolution. Although he
promised to form a new National Assembly within four years,
the amir's death in 1977 left the question open to debate
within the Al Sabah ruling family on the future of the
assembly. [Ref. 13:Chapter 2]
The National Assembly was restored in 1981 for several
reasons. The amir was not adamantly opposed, there was much
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popular support in the country and there was a need to enhance
the legitimacy of the regime in the face of the Iranian
Revolution. With the restoration came a restructuring of the
electoral districts, which resulted in the election of an
assembly that was heavily weighted toward pro-government
bedouin. The sixth assembly, elected in 1985, proved more
active and vigorous than the fifth assembly. One of the most
successful groupings in the election was the Democratic Bloc
whose members (leftists) ran on a platform of government
inefficiency and the need for reform. The conservative Shia
and Sunni Islamic groups did not do as well as expected mainly
because of a failure to coordinate campaigns between the two
religious sects.
The increasing criticism of government actions and accusa-
tions of financial impropriety of some of the Al Sabah family
members led to the dissolution of the assembly by the amir in
July 1986. Again, the amir restricted press activities and
set aside constitutional requirements to hold new elections in
two months. This second suspension had "an air of permanence
about it, unlike the first one." Press restrictions were far
more severe than in 1976 and the cabinet was reformed that had
pro -government allies, including ex-assembly members. [Ref.
13:pp. 41-51]
Given Kuwait's longer tradition and history of institu-
tions of political participation, it seems likely that, sooner
or later, the National Assembly would have been restored with
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or without a catalyst event. However, until 1990, the "ruling
Sabah family showed not the slightest interest in resuscitat-
ing it." [Ref. 29 :p. 47] It was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
in August 1990 that led to the latest election. Like King
Fahd in Saudi Arabia, the Kuwaiti Amir pledged to restore the
assembly following the liberation by allied forces.
The manner in which this most recent Kuwaiti experiment
plays out may be an interesting indication of the future of
political participation within the Arabian peninsula. Elec-
tions were held on October 5, 1992 to vote for the Seventh
National Assembly, in which 278 candidates vied for 50 seats
in parliament. Although only about 80,000 of the 600,000
Kuwaiti nationals (not to mention nearly one million non-
nationals) were eligible to vote 2 , the result was a surpris-
ing mandate against government supporters. Indeed, 31 of the
50 seats went to candidates that included three separate and
often ideologically diverse groups generally regarded as in
opposition to government policies. These include the
Islamists (both Shia and Sunni) , the Democratic Forum
(leftists and nationalists) and some other loosely aligned
independents. [Ref. 30 :p. 8]
Although generally loyal to the ruling family, these
opposition groups (reflecting a mood throughout the country)
are concerned mostly with government accountability,
2Eligible voters included male Kuwaitis over 21 whose
families have resided in the country since 1920.
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especially regarding the public purse (which often is seen to
be the private purse of the Al Sabah) , as well as responsibil-
ity for the events which led to the invasion by Iraq in 1990.
Specifically, the Islamic candidates have called for an amend-
ment to the constitution so that sharia law becomes the sole
source of legislation. Additionally, they have expressed deep
reservations about Kuwait's very close political and military
relationship with the United States. [Ref. 31] Many other
candidates want the government to account for suspicious
financial policies going back as far as 1982, as well as its
free-spending policies since the liberation. [Ref. 29 :p. 47]
Additionally, the opposition has expressed a desire to
separate the office of prime minister from that of the Crown
Prince
.
It is noteworthy that many of these issues, particularly
the challenges to the government's financial improprieties,
contributed heavily to the amir's decision to dissolve the
National Assembly in 1986. How the government deals with this
newly elected, and far more vocal and oppositionist body, will
be an important signal of future Gulf political development.
Perhaps as a note of warning, the amir, just a week after the
elections, reappointed his heir, the Crown Prince, as Prime
Minister in defiance of opposition calls for a separation of
those two offices. This move was described by diplomats in
Kuwait "as a slap in the face to the opposition." [Ref. 32]
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The bottom line of this brief discussion on the develop-
ment of participatory political institutions in the Arabian
peninsula demonstrates that political power still remains
firmly in the hands of the ruling families. The rulers have
seemed to form these bodies in reaction to liberal elements in
society or external pressure. Indeed, the establishment of
the only electoral bodies in the Gulf, in Bahrain and Kuwait,
may well have been a reaction to the strong Arab nationalist
movements that predominated Arab politics in the 1960s and
1970s. Clearly, they intended these bodies to serve as safety
valves rather than a substantive body to challenge government
policy and participate in the decision making process. When
these bodies became too aggressive, as in the case of Kuwait
and Bahrain, the rulers moved to dissolve them. Similarly,
the rulers follow the constitution only when it suits them and
disregard it completely when they face challenges to their
authority.
In the past decade, perhaps responding to the Right wing
challenge from Islamic movements, there appears to be an
increasing insularity within the ruling families, and a
greater need to monopolize political power. Using external
crisis to justify this, Kuwait's ruler was able to dissolve
the National Council in 1986. Today in Kuwait, "nothing
worries the pro-parliament lobby more than the thought that
the Iraqi threat will be invoked to shelve reform." [Ref.
33 :p. 15] Reflecting the political atmosphere in the Gulf, it
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was a revealing comment that, following the dissolution of
Kuwait's National Assembly in 1986, the common quip was that
Kuwait had finally joined the GCC . [Ref . 13 :p. 51] Indeed,
following a meeting of GCC intellectuals in December 1991, a
Bahraini theologian, Abd al-Latif Mahmoud, was arrested on his
return home for a lecture he delivered that argued for
domestic political reform throughout the GCC. In this
lecture, he called for elected parliaments, freedom of expres-
sion, the rule of law and curbs on the powers and privileges
of ruling families. Although he was later released on bail,
this may be a harbinger of things to come. [Ref. 27 :p. 11]
Similarly, in May 1992, a group of 54 prominent Qatar citizens
presented the amir with a petition demanding free parliamen-
tary elections, a written constitution and the expansion of
personal and political freedoms. The petition noted that
. . .such demands, while reflecting promises made in the
past by the authorities themselves to hold free
elections as long as two decades ago, constitutes a
recognition of the right of citizens to run the
affairs of their nation, and is in accordance with our
Islamic faith, which directs us to adopt consultations
and abide by them.
Within weeks after the petition was delivered, nearly all
those involved came under some kind of government pressure
from wire tap of phones, to confiscation of passports, to
outright arrest. [Ref. 34]
It is safe to conclude that decision making in all the GCC
states remains firmly in the hands of the ruling families and
that this tiny elite as a group is virtually impenetrable.
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"Such narrowness in the decision-making process leads to stag-
nation in outlook, particularly as it affects the development
process, and, potentially, to alienation." [Ref. 13 :p. 17]
It is for this reason that the manner in which Kuwait deals
with its newest attempt to expand power in the system and
assimilate social groups into the decision making process is
critical to the future stability of the Arabian peninsula.
B. SOCIAL GROUPS IN GULF ARAB POLITIES
Having discussed the character of political participation
in the Gulf Arab states, it is now appropriate to examine some
of the major groups that exist within these societies. These
groupings are important because of their potential mobiliza-
tion as a force of political destabilization in these vastly
conservative polities. After discussing these groups, we will
then examine the ideologies which provide the vehicles for
political mobilization. Any discussion on Gulf Arab societies
should begin with the nature of the rentier economy that
exists in the GCC states because these economies impact
considerably upon the makeup of society.
The gulf oil shaykhdoms are generally considered the
premier examples of the "rentier state." The rentier state
possesses an economy which relies primarily on its external
rent or revenues that flow into the country from the export of
a natural resource the nation may possess. For the GCC
states, this resource is oil. It is an economy "where the
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creation of wealth is centered around a small fraction of the
society; the rest of the society is only engaged in the
distribution and utilization of this wealth." [Ref. 35:p. 87]
Further, the government is the principle recipient of that oil
revenue and political leaders are the "preeminent economic
decision makers ... their values, far more than the market
place, dictates economic policy." [Ref. 36 :p. 19] These
political leaders use their tremendous wealth in order to
shore up their viability by distribution of that wealth
throughout the society. Further, there is no requirement to
tax citizens. The relative stability of these regimes to date
(when compared to other Middle East regimes in the past four
decades) , many have suggested, was possible due to the ability
of the rulers to "buy" political stability through the
redistribution of oil revenues to citizens in the country. 3
An additional political implication of the rentier states
is to deepen the division between the ruling elite and the
people. Since the economic wealth of these patrimonial states
is concentrated in the hands of a few, their political power
is enhanced. The rentier character tends to strengthen the
exclusivity of the ruling elite, thus intensifying the
political and economic gap between the rulers and the ruled.
3 See Giacomo Luciani's "Allocation vs Production States:
A Theoretical Framework," and Hazen Beblawi's "The Rentier
State in the Arab World," in Giacomo Luciani, Ed., The Arab
State , University of California Press, 1990.
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The industrialization that followed the advent of oil
required the need to import expatriate skilled and unskilled
labor. What developed was a vast difference between nationals
and non-nationals in these societies. For the citizens of the
country, there was a certain economic value in holding
citizenship, thus creating a "welfare mentality" that expected
these allocation states to provide various services. The
expatriate labor increasingly came to dominate the "produc-
tion" jobs that required real work. This encompassed
everything from menial labor to skilled oil-related jobs. The
expatriate labor, while doing the lion's share of the work,
has received little of the benefit of the oil revenues and is
politically alienated from the society. "The political
cleavage between the two communities widens as the economic
rent to citizens increases." Further, "though they serve the
country, live--and also die--on its soil, they are not part of
it." [Ref. 35 :p. 95] The political implications of this
situation will be discussed shortly.
An individual's awareness in a traditional society rises
rapidly as that society develops and modernizes. This
includes awareness of the amount of wealth that the oil is
producing and the relationship of the ruling family to that
wealth and to the society in general. "The Gulf states are no
longer traditional tribal societies, and ruling families
increasingly risk being perceived as an elitist class acting
solely in their own interests." [Ref. 13 :p. 11] The
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challenge in the 1980s to Kuwait's Al-Sabah family regarding
allegations that the public coffer was used to bail out family
members following the 1982 Suq al-Manakh market crash is a
case in point. [Ref. 35 :p. 95] It was this grievance that
led the amir to dissolve the parliament in 1986, a move which
did little to refute the charges of the challenge.
Investment in the Western industrial economies by gulf
rulers has been considerable. Saudi Arabian investments in
the United States alone is estimated at $70 billion. [Ref.
6:p. 418] These investments are seen by gulf economists as a
means to provide an insurance policy for the future. The
resultant ties and interdependence with Western economies and
interests, particularly with reports of some suspicious and
"dodgy" investments abroad [Ref. 29 :p. 47] by family members,
adds to this perception that ruling families are acting in
their own personal interests. What is worse is the idea that
their interests are so closely tied to (if not manipulated by)
the West. Prior to the overthrow of their monarchies, Libya
and Iraq provide examples of potential difficulties with this
situation. In both "cases, the ruling family was seen as
being subservient to foreign interests not just from a
political point of view, but from a revenue point of view as
well: they were forfeiting revenue. It is in this respect
that corruption becomes important." [Ref. 35 :p. 77]
The Arab rentier states of the Persian Gulf clearly have
certain political advantages in the wealth that is so closely
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tied to the ruling families. The ability to buy political
support as well as the lack of the need to tax its citizens
provides these states with a substantive instrument to ensure
stability without expanding the social bases of political rule
(power in the political system) . However, increasing fluctua-
tions in the world economy (i.e., oil glut in the mid-1980s),
rising perceptions of ruling family corruption, as well as the
interdependence with the Western economy, has resulted in an
increasing demand for accountability and greater diversity
between the nation's public coffers and the private finances
of the ruling family members. Further, these economies have
created two very different social groups in the societies, one
of which has been restricted from any political role in the
polity.
The expatriate population in the GCC states has assumed
significant proportions of both the labor force and the
overall population of the country. In some cases, nationals
are finding themselves increasingly in the minority. In
Kuwait, non-nationals represent 80 percent of the labor force
prior to the Iraqi invasion. [Ref. 37 :p. 51] Similarly, the
percentage of expatriate workers in the labor force in Saudi
Arabia is 75 percent, in UAE is 90 percent and in Bahrain is
56 percent. 4
"See U.S. Department of State, Background Notes , for
respective countries.
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The welfare nature of these rentier states provides too
many opportunities for nationals to seek bureaucratic and
government employment which in many ways is often used as an
unemployment benefit. [Ref. 38 :p. 671] There is little
economic incentive that attracts nationals to skilled
training, thus increasing the dependence on foreign labor.
The massive influx of foreign labor into the GCC countries in
the past two decades has been met with efforts to ensure
complete separation of this foreign population with the
national population. While migrants are integrated economi-
cally, they are alienated both socially and politically.
"Separation, not integration or assimilation is the goal."
[Ref. 39:p. 163]
GCC governments keep firm control over the expatriate
populations by issuing temporary visas, restricting families
from accompanying the workers and making citizenship require-
ments next to impossible to meet. Additionally, the relation-
ship between the expatriate force and the state has been
financially beneficial and thus the non-nationals have been to
date relatively docile politically. However, the large influx
has created a momentum which cannot be ignored. [Ref. 19 :p.
194] Despite efforts to limit the expatriate populations,
there are increasing numbers of non-national Asian and Arab
workers who have resided in GCC countries all their lives
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if not for several generations. Along with this has been a
natural increase in non-national populations through births. 5
Many observers of GCC countries are beginning to acknowl-
edge the potential problems associated with these non-national
populations. Glen Balfour-Paul notes that this has been
recognized as
...a problem of nightmare quality .... In brute terms
the alternatives are either to retain national
discrimination and view the immigrants as a temporary
embarrassment or to liberalize substantially the
nationalization laws- -the former risking economic
collapse, the latter a non-national takeover. [Ref.
19:p. 161
Sharon Stanton Russell sums up the problem well in her essay
on political integration of migrant workers into the Gulf
states
:
The future status of migrants in the polities of the
Gulf must be determined in the context of rethinking
how long-range political stability and economic
prosperity are best achieved. The underlying assump-
tions on the bases of which Gulf states chose to
ensure domestic political stability and regime support
by differentiating sharply between citizens and non-
citizens have changed. In many places citizens are
not the majority they were when basic nationality laws
were passed. ... Both past naturalizations and rising
levels of education and technical skill have intro-
duced new subgroups, expectations and complexities
among the citizenry itself. The increased sensitivity
of the population to basic Islamic principles has only
deepened the moral dilemmas inherent in differential
treatment of Muslim Arab naturalized citizens and non-
citizens alike. Nor are migrants merely the temporary
sojourners they were once expected to be. They are
long-term residents ... they are, increasingly, native-
born sons and daughters whose commitment to their
5See George Sabagh's essay, "Immigrants in the Arab
Countries: Sojourners or Settlers?", in Luciani and Salame,
Eds., The Politics of Arab Integration .
66
country of birth remains an unchanneled resource for
stability. Together, these factors pose new chal-
lenges to the internal coherence of Gulf societies,
argue for a careful reassessment of the role of
migrants in their host countries and will make migra-
tion a continuing factor in political integration for
years to come. [Ref. 39:p. 208]
In view of the continuing restrictions on political
participation among national citizens, it seems likely that
the political alienation of non-nationals will remain a fact
of Gulf life for the foreseeable future. A failure to address
this by the regimes can only result in difficulty.
As alluded to above, the welfare nature of these states,
opportunities for government jobs and overwhelming dependence
on foreign labor has created problems of work ethics among
many nationals. In fact many have suggested an outright
aversion to productive labor has become ingrained in the work
ethics of many young Arab nationals in these Gulf nations.
Despite this, however, several national socioeconomic and
sectarian groups have emerged as potential challengers to the
current status quo. Probably the most powerful is what
appears to be an emerging middle class throughout the Gulf.
In Saudi Arabia, reflecting the rest of the Gulf, this new
class consists of technocrats, professionals, entrepreneurs,
merchants and military officers. [Ref. 40 :p. 163] Often
educated in American, European and Egyptian universities, this
group is beginning to "consider themselves better qualified. .
.
than members of the royal family...." to make decisions
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of national importance. "They chafe under the prevailing
system. " [Ref . 6:p. 74]
Modernists, nationalists or liberal, they represent a
broad range of interests and desires. In the context of Gulf
politics, of course, they are "Left" of center. They
...support the right of labor to unionize; the right
of women to education, freedom of choice and employ-
ment; the institution of self-governing bodies and
public representation; the standardization of law; the
elimination of state allowances to members of the
ruling families; the assimilation of Arab foreign
labor; and merger between the Gulf states as a prelude
to Arab unity. [Ref. 12 :p. 445]
Despite their considerable personal achievements, they are
still excluded from the decision making process by the
traditional ruling families. The kinds of reforms that they
are calling for impinge directly upon the monopoly of
political and economic power that the rulers currently hold
and, as we have seen above, the rulers have only given in when
faced with considerable internal and external pressures.
Undoubtedly, these pressures will continue to increase given
the expansion of the ranks of the emerging middle class,
increasing frustration and urbanized masses that are becoming
more educated and sophisticated. [Ref. 40 :p. 166]
If this secular-minded, liberal and Western-educated
emerging middle class is pushing for more democratic reform
from the Left, the Right has risen as a counterforce to these
efforts in the form of Islamists. As has been apparent
throughout this paper, Islam has always played a preeminent
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role in Gulf politics and the regimes have maintained some of
their legitimacy by ensuring that Islamic principles, such as
Sharia law, assume a prominent position in their conduct of
government. This has become particularly necessary with the
rise of Islamic fundamentalist movements in the past decade
and Gulf regimes have found it necessary to assume a more
conservative religious posture. Of course, in Saudi Arabia,
given the historic Wahhabi-Saudi alliance and its self-
proclaimed role as protector of the Holy mosques, a very
conservative religious form of government has been a fact of
political life since the establishment of the Kingdom earlier
in this century.
It is thus particularly worrisome to the ruling families
of these traditionally conservative regimes when they come
under attack from a religious Right which is challenging the
very essence of their legitimacy. These religious scholars
and intellectuals reject, in particular, the Western ideas
which appear to define the direction in which modernization
should move. They want a return to the basic principles of
Islam as the defining construct of political, social and
economic behavior and chafe at the close military and economic
relationship that these countries, Saudi Arabia in particular,
have developed with the United States. In fact, they
intensely distrust Western intentions in the region and tie
them closely with Zionist aspirations. During the Gulf crisis
and the deployment of half -a-million foreign troops to the
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Arabian peninsula, Saudi theologians questioned the prudence
of such a move, feeling that the crisis was being used by the
West as "a pretext to occupy the Muslim heartland." An imam
in Riyadh asked during the crisis, "If a dog has come onto
your land, would you invite a lion to get rid of it?" [Ref.
41:pp. 9-10] Another opinion notes the deployment of "infidel
troops on Arabian soil had exposed the Saudi monarchy to the
delegitimizing charge that it was consorting with the infidels
and, by extension, with their natural allies, the Zionists."
[Ref. 41:p. 11]
In Saudi Arabia, two petitions have been issued in the
last two years by fundamentalist clergymen criticizing all
aspects of the Kingdom's foreign and domestic policy. The
most recent was presented in July 1992 and represents their
basic philosophy as well as increasingly bold criticism of the
Saudi regime. [Ref. 42] In foreign policy, the clergymen
demanded that the military pacts signed with the United States
be canceled; they urged arms purchases from a "variety of
countries, not from one particular country"; and they rejected
a "reliance on any foreign power, even in defense of" Saudi
Arabia. [Ref. 43] Domestically, they insisted that the
Sharia should be the sole base of Saudi laws. "To resort to
French penal law or civil Egyptian law is totally unaccepta-
ble. " Further, they attacked the government on human rights
violations and economic polices that borrowed "from over 30
international banks at interest which led to debts of tens of
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billions of dollars, especially during the gulf war."
Additionally, they called for the expansion of the army to
500,000 men and criticized the government controlled press
that had lost the public's trust, leading "people to resort to
the aggressive media of the unbelieving countries in an effort
to obtain facts and truth." [Ref. 43]
While the fundamentalist clearly do not represent a vast
majority, there is a powerful message in their attack on the
Saudi regime which challenges the legitimacy of modernization
on Western lines, and indeed the very basis of the Saudi
regime. This attack is far more pervasive and dangerous than
those of secular Arab nationalists such as Nasser and the
Bathists in the 1950s and 1960s. They cannot ignore this
challenge and thus are posed with the classic dilemma of
placating both the Left and Right without undermining their
own position. Like the liberals, the fundamentalists are
calling for greater say within the government, although based
on the Islamic principle of consultation rather than western-
style democracy. [Ref. 44 :p. 42] The result most often is an
increasingly close hold on political power. Despite attempts
at national councils, this appears to be occurring today as
has been demonstrated above. The longer that these forces in
society, liberal or conservative, are kept out of the
decision-making process, the more likely they are to resort to
extreme means. Regional ideologies can become very important
as a mobilizing force for political action, particularly when
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they are able to apply powerful symbols of discontent. As we
will see in the last section of this chapter, the most
powerful symbol that has been used in the Middle East in the
20th century has been anti-imperialism.
C. IDEOLOGIES
The populist appeal of Arab nationalism and Islamicism
were discussed in the previous chapter. It is, however,
important to further emphasize and illustrate a common
symbolic thread which runs through both ideologies, though
diametrically opposed, that has made them so successful as
tools of political mobilization. That common thread is anti-
imperialism.
The half-century which preceded the fall of the Ottoman
empire witnessed considerable political and economic changes
in the Middle East. The attempts by the Sultans of the
Ottoman Porte to modernize the fledgling empire led to the
spread of many Western ideas in the urban centers of Damascus,
Beirut, Jerusalem and Baghdad. Along with this spread of
ideas was the military, political and economic penetration by
European powers into the region throughout the 19th century.
Algeria was invaded by France in 1830, Egypt came under
British occupation in 1882 and Libya was colonized by Italy in
1911. Consequent with these developments, political thought
of Islamic thinkers expanded and evolved in attempts to under-
stand the problems of transitioning Middle Eastern society to
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a modern world dominated by the West, and to formulate new
theories in attempts to reinvigorate the "sickman of Europe."
The focus of their concern for the deterioration of the
empire centered on the survival of the Islamic community.
Jamal al-Din al -Afghani and Mohammad Abduh presented the
maturation of these efforts to reform the empire in order to
ensure the survival of Islam from foreign corruption. At the
same time there emerged an increasing sense of the Arab nation
which was tied, for historic reasons, explicitly to Islam.
"To return to the original purity of Islam meant in fact to
move the centre of gravity back from Turks to Arabs." [Ref.
16 :p. 268] This rising belief merged with the demise of the
Ottoman Empire following World War I. The aspirations of Arab
nationalism which emerged in force after the war were used, as
discussed earlier, by contending political elements in society
to maintain or gain power. The suppression of these aspira-
tions by the mandatory powers after the war crushed the
immediate realization of Pan-Arab unity. In its place, a more
particularist version of nationalism emerged based largely on
the political division of the Arab lands by the mandatory
powers. For the Arab nationalists of this interwar period,
their ideas were increasingly influenced by secular, Western
concepts of political development although they constantly
sought independence from the West
.
Islam, as a result, took an ideological back seat to the
nationalist system. The center of gravity was shifted from
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Islam as divine law to Islam as a culture. "Instead of Arab
nationalism being regarded as an indispensable step towards
the revival of Islam, Islam was regarded as the creator of the
Arab nation, the content of its culture or the object of its
collective pride." [Ref. 16 :p. 308] However, its influence
remained and always posed an intellectual dilemma.
Islam was what the Arabs had done in history, and in
a sense it had created them, given them unity, law, a
culture. For both Muslim and Christian Arabs, in
different ways, there lay a dilemma at the bottom of
Arab nationalism: secularism was necessary as a
system of government, but how was complete secularism
compatible with the existence of an Arab sentiment?"
[Ref. 16:p. 297]
Indeed, that question continues to haunt Arab leaders and
intellectuals today.
Throughout the interwar period, nationalist agitation
expanded and continued both against colonial occupiers and
their perceived proxies or puppets that ruled the monarchies
in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan. The continued Jewish
immigration in Palestine added fuel to this explosive mixture
and the last half of the 1930s witnessed uprising and
political agitation from the Persian Gulf states to Jerusalem.
World War II and the weight of modernization ushered in a new
era in Arab politics. In the wake of the 1948 Palestine war,
a new middle class represented by Nasserism in Egypt and the
Ba'th Party in Syria rose up to seize power.
The case they had made against the ancien regime was
the standard case made by broadly-based middle-class
nationalists against older, more narrowly based
political regimes: that they were embarrassingly weak
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and compromised, prone to collaboration, disconnected
from aspiring social classes, and easily torn to
shreds by outsiders. [Ref. 24 :p. 15]
The period that followed lasted until 1967. "This was the
era of Suez, of the fight for Algeria, of the collapse of the
Iraqi Hashemite monarchy in 1958, of the great crusade of
nonalignment , and of the fight against the West." These new
regimes
...had the capacity to mobilize; they could promise
socioeconomic justice, political participation, and
the capacity to take on the outside world without
defeat or collaboration. Like other such nationalists
elsewhere, this generation's symbols had thrown young
men and women into a whirlwind of excitement and
frenzy. [Ref. 24:p. 15]
By the end of the 1950s, the Arab state-system had polarized
into two camps- -radical and conservative. The so-called Arab
Cold War that followed saw the conservative regimes of Saudi
Arabia, the Gulf principalities and Jordan constantly on the
defensive against aggressive political and, at times, military
attacks on their legitimacy from the radical camp of Nasser's
Egypt, and Ba'thist Syria. The devastating defeat to Arab
armies in 1967 undermined the radical leftist ideology which
concentrated more on symbols and anti-imperialism and less on
the real issues of addressing socioeconomic and political
grievances that were racking Arab societies.
The fall of Arab nationalism ideology gave respite, if
temporary, to the conservative regimes and seemed to validate
their stand against "wild men, imported ideologies, and
subversive movements." [Ref. 24 :p. 73] The 1970s and the oil
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boom that characterized that decade saw the reemergence of the
conservative Gulf regimes as leaders in the Arab world.
However, the same forces which had been mobilized by Arab
nationalism in the 1950s still remained latent. "Now a
younger generation- -for whom liberalism had become anathema,
another word for Western colonialism- -would seek a different
inspiration." [Ref . 24 :p. 48] Indeed, the nationalist
impulses that had been
. . .unleashed by the Egyptian Revolution. . .were not
arrested by the diplomatic and military containment of
Egypt in 1967. The challenge posed by Iran's Islamic
revolutionary ideology is different only in form from
that presented earlier by Egypt's revolutionary pan-
Arabism. [Ref. 25:p. 510]
This new ideology mobilized and excited the same forces in
society that were trying to come to grips with social disrup-
tions and the insecurity associated with modernization.
The time bomb of pan-nationalism, now couched in
Islamic rather than secular terms, was likely to
explode in the face of the Middle Eastern elites....
The perceived capitulation of the conservative elites
to foreign pressure, and especially to Israeli
advances, served to sharpen the focus of this radical
pan-Islamic orientation. [Ref. 25:p. 520]
As with pan-nationalism in the 1950s, "the resurgence of Islam
is a response to the blockage of ideas and the failure of
state elites." [Ref. 24 :p. 212] This belief played an
important mobilizing role in the Iranian Revolution of 1979.
Under the populist appeal of Islamic resurgence, ideologically
diverse social and political groups in Iranian society formed
a coalition that opposed the shah. Much of the focus of that
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opposition centered upon the relationship with the United
States. [Ref. 45 :p. 214] The three broad factions that made
up the opposition movement included left -oriented Marxists,
middle-class liberal secularists and religious fundamentalist
clergy. In the end, Ayatollah Khomeini's clergy was able to
consolidate the revolution because of its mass appeal to
Islamic and anti-imperial symbols as well as the institutional
(mosque-based) infrastructure that the clerical establishment
enjoyed. [Ref. 46 :p. 168] The other factions had been forced
to join with the clergy in hopes that they would be able to
use this appeal to overthrow the shah but then gain control of
the revolution and the country. Khomeini and his clerics
proved too strong and were able to destroy the other factions
within several years
.
As Nasser had done in the 1950s, the Islamic Revolution
used as its most potent symbol for mobilization an intense
anti-imperialist sentiment. Indeed, this version would prove
far more energetic than anything Nasser had been able to
muster. Furthermore, 'it would present to the conservative
monarchies of the Gulf, a "more dangerous adversary; it easily
pointed out the transgressions of those who had professed
their adherence to Islam." This political Islam "provides the
arena in which political, and largely oppositional, sentiments
can be expressed." [Ref. 41 :p. 18] Emerging from the culture
itself, from the very essence of the Arab nation, fundamental-
ism could not be combated with the usual exhortations that it
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was an imported ideology from the West. While it probably
lacks the coherence to govern, "it can topple the world of the
elites, shatter their illusions, demonstrate that they have
surrendered to the ways of the aliens." [Ref. 24 :p. 209]
Consequently, the 1980s witnessed the conservative regimes
increasingly professing their adherence to Islam, and tried
desperately to appear as distant from the West as possible, in
attempts not to be out-Islamicized by the fundamentalist move-
ments that gained strength throughout the region.
In the most recent Gulf crisis, even the avowed secular-
ist, Saddam Hussein, was able to attack the conservative
regimes using this theme. "Saddam was able to argue that,
like Palestine, the land containing the holy cities of Mecca
and Medina had itself fallen prey to occupation. He spoke of
the need to liberate Mecca, 'hostage of the Americans,' from
troops of the Western-led coalition." This call was met with
positive response throughout the Muslim world as far away as
China. [Ref. 41:pp. 6-7] The Gulf crisis "highlighted the
important mobilizing role that Islamic symbolism and sentiment
play in the politics of Muslims." [Ref. 41 :p. 24]
Indeed, in the wake of the Gulf war, the Middle East has
seen the emergence and increasing strength of Islamic move-
ments throughout the region. In Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, the West Bank, the Sudan and the Arabian
Peninsula, these movements have been manipulating the same
discontent that Arab nationalism was able to manipulate in the
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1950s and 1960s. By pronouncing the true answer to the
problems of a transitioning world- -an answer founded in Arab
culture, rather than Western culture- -these movements can
utilize the powerful symbols of anti-imperialism to challenge
their regimes in power. In the wake of the Gulf war, with the
apparent hegemony of the United States in the region, this has
become a particularly useful tool to mobilize opposition.
It is not the intent of this chapter to announce the
impending fall of the Gulf shaykdoms in the near future.
Indeed, they have demonstrated considerable stability in the
past several decades especially when compared to their fellow
Middle-Eastern monarchies. This is probably due, in large
part, to the wealth associated with the oil boom and the
ruling families' nearly exclusive control over that wealth
which can be used to placate potentially discontented segments
of society.
Having noted this, however, this situation cannot last
forever, and it would be folly to assume that the Gulf states
of the 1990s will be the same as the Gulf states of the 1970s
and 1980s. Great changes have occurred both globally and
regionally which have accelerated the process of development
in this region and local events of the 1980s and early 1990s,
have illustrated for many in the region their role in the
world as well as in their own society. Expectations will only
rise from all segments of these societies as advances in
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communication, education and technology further expand the
horizons of Gulf peoples.
The first part of this chapter demonstrated that the
ruling families of the Gulf have made little substantive
progress toward expanding their political participatory
institutions. It may even be suggested that these regimes
have become increasingly isolated from their societies and
increasingly impenetrable. The system they have employed thus
far will not work into the next century if they do not move to
assimilate new social groups into the political decision-
making process. Even observers that have argued for the
stability of these regimes acknowledge that this is the case.
J.E. Peterson notes in his work on political participation in
the Persian Gulf that, "there is a tendency of ruling families
in the Gulf to dismiss the importance of political participa-
tion in national councils, preferring instead to rely on tra-
ditional methods, but this attitude is quickly becoming both
outdated and dangerous." [Ref. 13 :p. 121] Glen Balfour-Paul
echoes this sentiment in his essay, "Kuwait, Qatar and the
UAE: Political and Social Revolution." [Ref. 19 :p. 168]
If these regimes continue to exclude other groups in their
society from the decision-making process, these groups will
become increasingly vulnerable to mobilization by oppositional
ideologies, be they liberal or conservative. Currently, the
more dangerous challenge appears to come from the religious
Right. Its message rises from the very culture and plays upon
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the powerful symbols of anti-imperialism to help explain the
social disruptions and difficulties that these transitioning
societies are experiencing. It empowers the people and
strikes at the very heart of these conservative Gulf regimes.
The longer the ruling families hold on to their monopoly, the
greater the prospect of political disruptions and instability.
In an essay on current sources of instability in the
region, Shibley Telhami sums up the problem and the difficul-
ties it poses for American interests in the Persian Gulf.
To sustain themselves, Arab allies of the United
States might become more repressive and, as a result,
Islamic activism will rise. Since repression entails
the absence of the legal means to organize political
opposition, lacking alternative vehicles for mass
political organization, the populace will turn to
available social structures; in the case of the Middle
East, it is the mosques. The absence of legitimacy
through representative government, and the turn to
religious and cultural vehicles for mass political
mobilization, will fuel transnationalism in the region
even more. The potential consequences of these events
are not favorable in regard to US interests." [Ref.
47: pp. 4-5]
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IV. SINCE THE GULF WAR
The memory that weighs heavily on the minds of the
great generality of Muslims is of imperialist rule,
Western antagonism toward Arab nationalism, the
creation and fortifying of the state of Israel, and
American hostility toward the Islamic revolution in
Iran. [Ref. 41:p. 14]
...the road to Baghdad lay open before the American-
led coalition. A quarter-century earlier, in the
summer of 1967, the road to Cairo lay open before the
Israelis as well. The book ends of a quarter-century:
history repeats here, a cruel mixture of delusion and
betrayed promises. [Ref. 24 :p. 14]
As has been discussed in previous chapters, the experience
that the peoples of the Middle East have had with the Western
powers historically has been difficult to say the least. The
impact of the West, through the colonial and mandatory period,
as well as the exploitation of oil, has been socially, politi-
cally and economically dramatic and disruptive. Throughout
the 20th century, the people of this region have tried to deal
with this process of development and modernization that had
thrown their traditional society into shambles. Most often,
they were excited and mobilized politically by symbols with
which they could identify. Whether nationalistic or Islamic,
these symbols were and are used by social groups contending
for political power in society. For the Middle East experi-
ence, anti-Westernism of some form or the other emerged as the
most useful and applicable to the ideologies of both
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conservatives and liberals alike. It matters little if one
can argue that Western intentions and interests in the region
are benevolent. The overriding feeling and experience of "the
great generality" of Arabs is to the contrary. Perceptions
are important. Indeed, they are reality.
Perhaps the first thing to keep in mind when considering
American actions both during the Gulf War and in its aftermath
is this extremely potent perception of American military power
being used to ensure the personal survival and continuance in
power of the ruling families of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and
to a lesser extent those of the rest of the GCC . This image
becomes all the more nefarious given the popular conception of
American double standards when applied to Israel and tradi-
tional support for Gulf monarchies despite the lack of demo-
cratic movement in those societies. Set against the backdrop
of over ten years of ceaseless anti-American rhetoric
emanating from Tehran that applied Islamic images and symbols,
such a perception and its impact upon the stability of pro-
American regimes should not be underestimated.
Saddam Hussein was able to draw upon this perception with
some success among the masses. Mary Norris, in a RAND report
on the regional dynamics of the crisis, explains that:
Although there has been unprecedented support for U.S.
actions on the part of international and regional
governments, there has also been a groundswell of
support for Saddam by the populations of Arab
countries. This support does not come from personal
admiration of Saddam or his actions; most Arabs see
him as a bully and an opportunist who has seized the
83
issues of the day and wrapped himself in the flag of
Arab nationalism. . .they believe that he intends to use
this army to avenge Arab political and economic
exploitation at the hands of the West. They support
his stand against the West because Saddam has managed
to tap into an enormous reservoir of resentment that
is the product of centuries of Arab humiliation, first
at the hands of the Ottoman Empire and then at the
hands of the West. Arab sentiment is with Kuwait
against Iraq- -but with Iraq against the United States
and the West. [Ref. 48:pp. 6-7]
She continues by noting that, "The real question is not why
Saddam is popular among Arabs; rather, it is the significance
of his popularity in both the current context of the war and
in its aftermath that requires attention." [Ref. 48 :p. 7]
The preceding chapters have attempted to shed some light on
that significance. The problem is that American policy in the
region since the Gulf War has seemed entirely to ignore this
underlying issue and, instead, enthralled with the military
success of Desert Storm, has expanded to an unprecedented
level the military component of U.S. strategy toward the
Persian Gulf region.
A. DEFENSE TREATIES
The defense arrangements that several of the Gulf states
have signed with the United States and other Western powers is
virtually unprecedented since the British pulled out of the
Gulf 20 years ago. Further, before the Gulf crisis, the
concept of such negotiations would never have been considered
seriously in a public forum. Today,
Two years after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the United
States has deepened its commitment to defending the
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oil-rich Arab states on the Persian Gulf through
bilateral security agreements and is maintaining its
largest- -and most visible- -peacetime military presence
in the gulf . " [Ref . 49]
Thus far, the United States has negotiated defense pacts
with Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar. These 10-year pacts provide
for U.S. access to port and basing facilities, pre-positioning
of equipment in some cases and the establishment of security
assistance training as well as joint bilateral exercises
between host country and American military forces. That many
of the details of the accords remain classified matters little
to the overall perception. It is, instead, the well-
publicized fact of the treaties that impacts upon the Arab
view of the Western-GCC relationship. After unveiling the
agreement in Kuwait in September 1991, the Kuwaiti foreign
minister noted that the pact "implicitly" committed the United
States to Kuwait's defense. [Ref. 50 :p. 13] Whether this is
true or not, such statements do little to refute the
perception.
Bahrain has been somewhat more hesitant about publicizing
its relationship. Similarly, Saudi Arabia has "expressed a
reluctance to develop formal military ties with Washington,
particularly if these were to lead to visible U.S. military
presence in the kingdom." [Ref. 49] Notwithstanding the
well-known presence of American combat aircraft flying from
airfields in Saudi Arabia in support of Operation Southern
Watch (no-fly regime in southern Iraq) [Ref. 51:p. 29], the
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rulers are increasingly re-understanding the quandary of a
close and well-known security relationship with the United
States. "Such an arrangement leaves Saudi policy makers under
possible charges from both within and outside the country of
'selling out' and being too closely aligned with an 'imperial'
power." [Ref. 52:p. 110]
These charges carry more weight when juxtaposed with the
rejection by the GCC states of the Damascus Declaration, which
amounted to an "Arab solution" to the Gulf security problem.
This declaration was announced in March 1991 by the six GCC
states and Egypt and Syria. Also known as "6+2," the arrange-
ment envisioned a formal Arab alliance which would provide for
the presence of significant Syrian and Egyptian military
forces in the Arabian peninsula to form a protective shield
for future Iraqi or possibly Iranian ventures into the area.
In return for Syrian and Egyptian protection, the GCC would
provide "suitable financial recompense." [Ref. 53 :p. 16] As
early as April 1991, the GCC had quietly informed Cairo and
Damascus that they were not interested in a permanent presence
of non-Gulf Arab forces in the region and Egyptian and Syrian
troops were redeployed soon after. Instead, they have turned
to the United States and the West for security guarantees.
Whether the Damascus Declaration failed from Iranian
pressures [Ref. 50:p. 13], or due to a simple distrust of
Syrian and Egyptian designs, is not important. What is impor-
tant is the image of the GCC turning away from the rest of the
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Arab world and turning toward the West. [Ref. 27 :p. 11] This
increases the already unfavorable view that non-Gulf Arabs
have of the Shaykhdoms and increases the specter of the
division between the haves and the have-nots.
Finally, within the GCC itself, while there appears to be
consensus that some kind of integration of military forces is
required, there has bene no agreement on substance. Despite
great expectations, the annual GCC summit held in December
1991 in Kuwait produced little more than talk on security
issues. Oman's proposal to form a 100,000 man joint army for
the GCC states represented the only substantive issue brought
to the floor. It was shelved with gratitudes to Sultan Qaboos
for his efforts. [Ref. 27 :p. 11] Despite increasing calls
from both Islamic and liberal Gulf intellectuals for greater
integration of the GCC states, there seems instead to be more
disintegration given the rising rate of intra-GCC border
disputes. Ruling family rivalries appear to be the major
impediment and a fear that any kind of "merger will weaken the
position of the present ruling family." [Ref. 12 :p. 446]
This, of course, further fuels the image of the GCC ruling
families acting explicitly in their own interests rather than
in the interests of their individual countries, the GCC as a
whole or, indeed, the "Arab nation."
87
B. EXPANDED MILITARY PRESENCE
Like the establishment of the bilateral defense pacts with
the individual GCC states, the expanded United States military
presence in the region is also unprecedented in peacetime.
This applies not so much to the size of the forces in the
Gulf, but more to the activity and visibility of their
presence. Today it is not unusual to open the newspaper and
see a picture of U.S. marines landing on a beach near Kuwait
City or an American nuclear submarine entering the port in
Manama, Bahrain. Three years ago, such sights were unheard
of. Even during the 1987-1988 Tanker War (American naval
forces escorted Kuwaiti tankers through the Persian Gulf)
,
U.S. warships were prohibited from entering Kuwaiti waters and
long leadtimes were required for units to enter most of the
Gulf countries. In contrast today, "We've got ships going
into ports left and right. We've got ships and airplanes
doing bilateral exercises left and right," noted a senior
American naval officer in a recent interview. [Ref . 49]
Rather than "over-the-horizon, " as had been the case prior to
the Gulf crisis, American military power has clearly moved to
a position "on-the-horizon. " [Ref. 49]
As noted above, bilateral exercises have increased as
well. In fact, since the Gulf War, major exercises have
multiplied five-fold. [Ref. 54] Additionally, and probably
more problematic, the United States has on numerous occasions
in the past year rattled the saber to force Iraq to comply
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with UN sanctions imposed following the Gulf War. While there
were very good reasons for this, it must be understood that
this further adds to the perception of an imperial giant in
the Gulf wielding its power.
Perhaps the most active and visible demonstration of
American military prowess in the region besides the Gulf War
itself is Operation Southern Watch. This operation has been
underway for nearly four months and entails the establishment
of a no- fly zone for Iraqi aircraft in roughly the southern
third of Iraq. It was established in order to provide a
military umbrella over Iraqi Shi' a who had come under attack
by the Iraqi air force, similar in some ways to the Kurdish
zone established in the north.
Although not a safe-haven by the definition of the Kurdish
zone, the decision to take action to protect the Shi ' a repre-
sented an obvious turnabout in American policy. Immediately
following the Gulf War, Iraqi Shi 'a in the south had rebelled
against the Baghdad government only to be crushed by Hussein's
forces while American troops still occupied parts of Iraq.
Justifying U.S. restraint, the Bush Administration reasoned
that it wanted to avoid a military quagmire. [Ref . 55] As
evidence began to mount in the summer of 1992 concerning a
renewed effort by Hussein to purge the so-called "Marsh Arabs"
from their homelands, and stung by charges that he had failed
in ousting Saddam Hussein, President Bush decided, along with
Britain and France, to put the air umbrella into operation.
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It would be disingenuous to pretend that the American-
led allies are being impelled back to the Gulf by a
romantic concern for a tribe of fishermen, or by a
sudden discovery of repression. What they want,
George Bush most of all, is Mr. Hussein's head. [Ref
.
56:p. 13]
Significantly, the allied coalition that is conducting
this operation has been considerably reduced from its wartime
membership. Globally, only the U.S., Britain and France are
involved and indeed have been the driving force for the estab-
lishment of the no-fly zone. Moreover, neither the Kurdish
safe-haven in the north nor the no-fly zone in the south have
been legalized by the United Nations. [Ref. 51 :p. 29] On the
regional level, the move has been opposed by both Syria and
Egypt, and within the GCC itself by the UAE and Oman. [Ref.
57] Only Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have supported the move.
Even this support has been qualified by Saudi Arabia. Riyadh
has announced that Saudi fighters will not fly over Iraq [Ref.
58] , and, on a publicity level, has refused visas to
journalists wanting to report on allied air forces flying from
the air base at Dhahran. [Ref. 59]
Clearly, there has been a real reduction in both interna-
tional and regional support for continued action of this sort.
More and more, the image of the three old imperialist
nations- -Britain, France and the United States- -acting
unilaterally in pursuit of their own perceived interests
(along with suggestions of American electoral politics) begins
to emerge. In another regional conflict that pits these
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Western powers against an Arab leader, Muammar Qaddafi, this
perception is reinforced. The UN Security Council's
condemnation of Libyan refusal to turn over suspected
terrorists was viewed in the Arab world with deep suspicion.
As The Economist noted last April,
Politics has rules of its own. One of them is that
when westerners gang up on an Arab country, other
Arabs are liable to spring- -if only rhetorically- -to
its defence. Most Arab governments were happy enough
about the squashing of Saddam Hussein. ... But , as Lady
Bracknell might have said, the Gulf war was a misfor-
tune. Another UN-led action against an Arab, little
more than a year later, begins to look like careless-
ness—or a deliberate policy of Arab-bashing. [Ref.
60:p. 18]
Operation Southern Watch has forced many Muslims to make
comparisons between the plight of Iraqi Shi 'is and the Bosnian
Muslims. Why, many Arabs ask, is the U.S. using warplanes in
southern Iraq to protect persecuted Shi 'is while continuing to
oppose action in the Balkans to stop Serbian aggression
against Bosnian Muslims? This appearance of a "double
standard" has been pointed out by most Arab nations including
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. [Ref. 61]
The view of American intentions in Iraq is considered
suspect throughout most of the Arab world. The Kurdish safe-
haven in the north and the no-fly zone in the south have
raised the specter of the dismemberment of the Iraqi state by
Western powers. For many Arabs, this kind of perception
brings back memories of the post -World War I period when
Britain and France divided the newly- freed Arab world into
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spheres of influence. One Arab editorial, commenting on this
issue, remarked that the Western policy could "mask other
objectives which arouse suspicion and concern, and which
involve plans for new maps and statelets." It concluded that,
. . .while we await the appearance of someone who can
clarify what is being planned for the region and its
peoples, all talk of human beings and their rights,
states and their sovereignty, and the use of resources
for development would appear to be wishful thinking.
It is the same hand that drew the maps of the states
that emerged after the two world wars which is now
redrafting them to ensure the security and existence
of several new Israels in the Middle East. [Ref.
62:pp. 21-22]
A daily paper in Jordan ran an editorial that made the
analogy between the Iraqi Shi 'is and the Nicaraguan Contras of
Reagan infamy. Suggesting that American policy was designed
to overthrow Hussein, this article asserted that "the task of
these 'contras' will be to attack the Iraqi army in Baghdad
and other cities while the Americans secure the skies. ..." It
concludes with the question whether American policy is "hoping
to establish a new and expanded Baghdad pact combining the
Gulf states, Turkey, Iran and Iraq with Egypt and whichever
other Arab countries might want to join"? [Ref. 63 :p. 26]
Again, the image of nefarious imperial or superpower intent-
tions and manipulation springs from these articles and the
perceived actions of the West.
C. ARMS CONTROL
In a RAND report written in the fall of 1990 for U.S.
Central Command regarding postwar force requirements in the
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Persian Gulf, the authors specifically recommended a "role for
focused diplomacy and arms control in increasing the stability
of the Gulf region in the wake of the recent crisis." [Ref.
64 :p. 27] Echoing this sentiment in his immediate postwar
address to Congress, President Bush announced that the reduc-
tion of arms proliferation in the Middle East would be a
fundamental goal of American policy in the region. This call
was met with great approval on capital hill and, on 29 May
1991, the President proposed an initiative that would restrain
arms transfers, freeze ballistic missile development and set
the course for the development of conventions on nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons in the region.
As in other areas, however, the administration's
approach was gradualist, eschewing calls from Congress
for an arms moratorium in favor of a modest attempt to
introduce the notion of arms control that would hamper
the efforts of radical regional powers to acquire
greater military capabilities while not interfering
with U.S. efforts to strengthen its friends. [Ref.
65:p. 86]
In October 1991, the five major arms suppliers to the
region (also the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council) agreed on some guidelines for arms transfers. While
"impressive" on paper, these guidelines had no means to force
compliance, did not include other arms exporters such as North
Korea, Argentina and Brazil, and became increasingly difficult
to abide by given shrinking domestic defense budgets. [Ref.
65:pp. 86-87] By March 1992, The Economist noted that the
. . .bid to rein back a conventional arms race in the
region has failed. But it is not the rogue sellers
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who are mainly responsible. The voluntary con-
straints, promoted by George Bush after the Gulf war,
were designed to prevent the sale of certain weapons
to certain countries. The unrespectable though
unnamed foursome are Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria. The
constraints have not checked the hot competition among
America, Britain and France to sell all sorts of
weapons to Arab countries considered respectable: the
cuts in domestic defence spending have made export
markets essential. [Ref. 66 :p. 48]
Saudi Arabia has embarked on a considerable buildup with
plans to triple its armed forces to 200,000 men. Given the
nation's indigenous population of just 6.7 million, it is
questionable whether the country has the ability to absorb and
assimilate the arms hardware on order. [Ref. 67 :p. 530]
Similarly, although to a much lesser extent, other GCC nations
have been buying first rate military equipment from Western
governments eager to maintain their fledgling defense indus-
tries at home. [Ref. 67:p. 530]
The two most recent and highly publicized sales to Gulf
states have been the major arms purchases by Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait this past fall. In early September, President Bush
announced the Administration's intent to sell 72 F-15 advanced
fighters to Saudi Arabia. Coming amidst his campaign for
reelection, the move was seen in many circles as an electoral
ploy. [Ref. 68] Similarly, about a month later, Kuwait
agreed to purchase 236 M1-A2 advanced main battle tanks from
the U.S. after intense competition between British and
American companies for the contract. Ultimately, top American
political leadership, including the President himself, weighed
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in to ensure the sale went to the United States. "To have
this kind of public display of Administration support is
unprecedented," said one Pentagon official. "Mind you,
though, if there were ever a country over which to exercise a
certain leverage, it was Kuwait." [Ref. 69] There are also
reports that the UAE is interested in buying 390 new tanks as
well. [Ref. 69]
These sales have completely undermined Western (particu-
larly American) attempts to restrict arms sales to Iran and
the other "unrespectable" nations. In fact, China has left
the Middle East talks because of the large American sale to
Taiwan of F-16s. [Ref. 70 :p. 13] Even America's European
allies are resisting demands to halt sales of militarily
useful equipment to Iran. [Ref. 71] If successful, though,
"it does not go far enough, for Iran still has access to other
armorers, including Russia, China and North Korea. And
pinching off these sources of supply will not be possible
until western arms salesmen make some additional sacrifices."
[Ref. 70 :p. 13] The well-publicized expansion of Iran's
military forces in the Gulf, including Russian submarines and
advance combat aircraft, would indicate that any prospect of
meaningful arms control in the region is dim at best . As the
arms race in the Gulf reaches unprecedented levels, the
implications for stability become increasingly ominous.
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D. BORDER DISPUTES
As mentioned above, there seems to be a consensus of sorts
among GCC leaders that the sooner the Gulf states begin to
integrate their six nations on all levels, the better off
everyone will be. When it comes to the practical application,
as evidenced by an inability to reach an agreement on a
future, multilateral security arrangement, the GCC has been
unable to make any concrete moves in that direction. Ruling
family rivalries and fears that such moves would erode both
sovereign and personal power seem to be the main culprit.
Indeed, events in the past year would suggest that rather
than moving together, the Arab states of the Arabian peninsula
are splitting apart. A number of incidents have been made
public regrading two longstanding border disputes between
Bahrain and Qatar (over the Hawar Islands) and between Saudi
Arabia and Qatar. In the latter case, gunfire was exchanged
along a border post between Saudi and Qatar forces on two
occasions at the end of September 1992. [Ref . 72] Some
observers commented that what was most unusual about the
incidents is that Doha went public about it, "further
undermining the pretence that the Gulf Cooperation Council is
cohesive enough to pursue the kind of long-term integration to
which so many of its citizens aspire." [Ref. 73 :p. 5]
Renewed problems over the boundary between Oman and Saudi
Arabia have added to this problem as well.
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Perhaps to demonstrate its frustration with the inability
of the GCC to handle these conflicts, Qatar has in the past
year been courting Iranian diplomatic initiatives. In fact,
Qatar boycotted a GCC annual conference of defense ministers
held in Kuwait in mid-November 1992 and there is talk that
Doha will boycott the annual GCC summit to be held in Abu
Dhabi in December 1992. At the same time, Qatar sent her
Ambassador back to Teheran. [Ref . 74 :p. 9] Furthermore,
Qatar last year negotiated a number of economic cooperation
agreements with Iran including plans for a multi-billion
dollar freshwater pipeline from the Qarun River in Iran to
Qatar. [Ref. 73:p. 6]
Adding to these intra-GCC strains, Iran has posed a direct
challenge to these states in its moves to annex the disputed
islands of Abu Musa (jointly shared by Iran and UAE since 1971
when the Shah's government occupied the islands) . Following
the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the ambiguous situation that
had developed under the Shah was continued, and essentially
allowed each country to claim sovereignty. This contradiction
was not challenged until April 1992 when Iranian authorities
expelled 100 UAE workers that did not possess Iranian visas.
The issue reemerged when Iran again refused to allow foreign-
ers to enter the islands without Iranian visas in late August
1992. [Ref. 75] In September, Iran began construction on a
military airfield and facilities for the establishment of Scud
missile batteries as well as radar stations. Teheran
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accompanied this with the evacuation of hundreds of Arabs from
the island to the UAE, thus affecting a de facto annexation of
the island. [Ref . 76:p. 5]
The Arab League issued a statement on 14 September 1992
criticizing Iran's "illegitimate occupation of Abu Musa, " and
declared support for the UAE if she chose to bring the matter
up to the UN. [Ref. 75] Talks between UAE and Iran broke
down at the end of the month. Since then, the GCC and Arab
allies have taken an increasingly assertive stand toward Iran
on the issue as a means, some have suggested, of shoring up
the disarray that has afflicted them since the Gulf war.
[Ref. 76 :p. 5] Additionally, there is no doubt that GCC
rulers are viewing, with increasing concern, the Iranian
expansion across the Gulf. Egypt, for her part, is using the
dispute in an attempt to revive the Damascus Declaration.
[Ref. 77:p. 5]
Iran's response to Arab condemnation has been to bring
anti-American rhetoric into the discussion. Following the
announcement of U.S. support for the UAE, Iran's religious
leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, announced that the dispute was
a "conspiracy" engineered by Washington "to justify its
illegitimate presence in the Persian Gulf." [Ref. 78] The
Iranians are not the only ones to make such an observation,
however. A Jordanian commentator noted in April 1992 that as
...the Arabs were preoccupied with the revival of
their longstanding quarrels, Iran- -without fanfare,
and in proximity to the American and British fleets
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that patrol the Gulf --went ahead and completed its
occupation of Abu Musa Island, which belongs to the
UAE. [Ref. 79:p. 21]
The allusion, of course, is that while the Westerners were
aware of the action and had the means to prevent it, they
allowed the occupation to continue in order to justify their
expanded presence in the Gulf. This editorial concluded that
...these inter-Arab borders are not being ignited
suddenly for no reason. The aim is to make permanent
the current state of Arab disintegration and increase
the fear which prompts some to adhere to America as
their supreme protector and guardian. Especially as
most of the borders concerned in the Peninsula and
Gulf are in areas that contain the oil which the US
needs so badly. [Ref. 79 :p. 22]
This perception of an American hand in these disputes has been
expanded to the Arab world in general by other Arab
commentators
:
These developments in the Arab world, and the fossii-
zation of certain vindictive and domineering atti-
tudes, make us fear that the process of disintegration
in the Arab nation will continue. It seems that the
"prophecy" of the orientalist Bernard Lewis about the
demise of Arab nationalism and joint Arab action is
not a coincidence, but an accurate description of a
plan that is being put into practice by certain Arab
circles connected to the United States. The conspira-
cy aims not only at tearing the Arab world apart and
building impenetrable walls between its peoples, but
at dismembering some of the Arab states which dared
take independent and principled stands during the
aggression against Iraq. [Ref. 80 :p. 20]
Analyzing each of the military initiatives that the United
States has undertaken since the end of the Gulf war, it is
difficult to argue against the legitimacy of those actions on
an individual basis. Indeed, there were very good reasons for
U.S. threatening moves toward Saddam Hussein in order to
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enforce UN sanctions. The naval posturing in the Persian Gulf
in response to Iran's acquisition of Russian submarines also
seems very appropriate under the circumstances. Similarly,
the establishment of Operation Southern Watch, whether one
argues on humanitarian grounds or simply to apply more
pressure on Hussein, can be defended within the confines of
the specific issue. One may even argue, with some justifica-
tion, that arms sales to Saudi Arabia, et al .
, are critical
for their self-defense in this dynamic region. These conten-
tions are especially pertinent in the wake of a war that many
believe occurred because the United States disengaged from the
region too quickly after the Iran-Iraq war.
The difficulty with these arguments is that they do not
address the whole picture that is being presented. These
initiatives, while appearing legitimate from the American
perspective, take on a different form when seen as a compila-
tion of actions that Western nations have been doing for
decades in pursuit of their own interests. The expanded
Western military presence in the Gulf is seen by many Arabs as
simply another manifestation of the imperialist ventures that
have penetrated their world for centuries. And while the
overt presence may deter an external aggressor such as Iran,
it may at the same time be undermining the very basis of
stability of the pro-American regimes in power. In other
words, American policy in the region is focusing so much on
the external threats that it is neglecting internal challenges
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to U.S. interests. Moreover, that overemphasis may be
unknowingly aiding internal forces that would overthrow the
pro-American regimes. Indeed, the record of American policy
in the Middle East since the end of World War II does not
suggest that the U.S. had been particularly sensitive to this
in the past
.
Richard K. Herrmann contends, in an essay on American
policy in the Middle East in the post cold war era, that
. . .superior military power may protect U.S. interests,
but regional security that is based simply on Washing-
ton' s ability to intimidate and project coercive
influence will be politically vulnerable. It will
reinforce local perceptions of the United States as an
imperial power and last only as long as the United
States can afford and is willing to sustain the power
asymmetry. [Ref. 81:p. 69]
The negotiations of bilateral defense treaties and the consid-
erable arms sales to the GCC regimes increases the "intimacy"
of the relationship between the United States and the ruling
families. Herrmann notes that it "deepens the association
between Washington and the regimes with which it is allied.
In an era of rising mass politics this can undermine the
legitimacy of these allied regimes and become a source of
instability in its own right." [Ref. 81 :p. 70] He warns that
while
. . .unilateral American security assistance contributes
to the deterrence function... a highly visible U.S.
military presence is often a lightning rod for
populist opposition. This is an old problem for the
United States in the Gulf and it is a dilemma that the
Gulf War did not solve. [Ref. 81:pp. 71-72]
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This chapter has tried to demonstrate the perception that
our expanded military presence and visibility has created in
the Middle East. It is not difficult for opposition groups in
the GCC societies to translate this perception into anti-
imperialist symbols which can be used to mobilize support. On
a more specific plane, Abdulaziz Bashir and Stephen Wright
echo Herrmann's thesis in their essay on Saudi Arabian foreign
policy after the Gulf War.
In short, given Western assistance to and support for
Saudi Arabia, its security from external aggression
appears to be well covered, although possibly at a
longer-term price in terms of providing grounds for
opposition based on Islamic sensitivities to such
arrangements. [Ref. 52 :p. Ill]
American policy is oriented toward an external threat (as it
was during the Cold War) because it is relatively easy to
identify and deter. It is the internal disruptions which have
traditionally posed the most problems for our policies in the
Middle East. There is nothing to indicate this will not be
the same in the future, and to focus on external, near-term
challenges both neglects and ultimately undermines the
internal stability of the pro-American regimes in power.
This is not to argue for a military disengagement from the
Persian Gulf. It is rather to suggest that we should not
appear to rely so heavily on organized violence, or the threat
of organized violence, to protect our interests. We should
deemphasize the military component of American policy in the
region if by no other means than decreasing the visibility of
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our forces, moving back to an "over-the-horizon" presence.
The demonstration of America's military capability and techno-
logical superiority during the Gulf War should have a
considerable deterrent effect on would-be aggressors for at
least the near future. Iranian leaders cannot ignore the fact
that a predominantly American force decimated in half-a-dozen
weeks an Iraqi army that the Iranians fought to a standstill
for eight years at the loss of a million men. In other words,
in the post cold war era, it is doubtful that the United
States will even require such an overwhelming presence in
order to deter a regional aggressor. More importantly,
though, the expanded presence threatens to undermine the very
foundation of stability that it is trying to maintain.
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V. CONCLUSION
...the war cannot be properly understood as simply a
failure in U.S. deterrence policy. It reflected the
failure of a political strategy that relied too
heavily on deterrence. Washington was preoccupied
with deterring Iran and lost sight of the intra-Arab
politics that were polarizing the region. It put too
little emphasis on developing a sophisticated politi-
cal strategy toward regional security and ultimately
was forced to rely on overwhelming military
superiority. [Ref. 81:p. 43]
As stated previously, it should be emphasized that the
preceding discussion is not necessarily predicting the pending
demise of the Gulf Arab monarchies. They have in the past
shown considerable resilience to both internal and external
challenges to their stability. This is particularly apparent
when considered relative to some of their northern Arab and
Persian neighbors. In large part, this is probably due to the
oil wealth they have accrued and the ability for rulers to
distribute it in order to maintain their own political
viability. Times are changing, however, and it would be
tragic for American policy makers to be lulled into a false
sense that simply because these shaykhdoms are economically
prosperous, they are politically stable. Eric Hooglund demon-
strates the potential consequences of this kind of thinking in
his essay on American policy toward Iran. "By the late 1960s,
policymakers in Washington were interpreting Iran's prosperi-
ty, induced by oil revenues, as evidence of political
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stability and were perceiving the shah as a valuable ally in
the Middle East region." [Ref. 45 :p. 212] The problem was
that the shah was not moving to reform the political system in
order to incorporate various social groups into the decision-
making process. Policy makers in Washington "assumed that the
types of reforms instituted by the shah would lead eventually
to broader political participation and thus to political
stability, this did not happen." [Ref. 45 :p. 211] President
Carter's toast to Iran's stability on the even of revolution
underlines Washington's ignorance of the internal political
and social atmosphere.
It would appear today that the United States is making the
same assumption with the states of the GCC. By focusing on
the external, perceived Iranian threat, the U.S. is choosing
military instruments to counter and deter this threat. These
instruments, however, cannot effectively counter internal
challenges to American interests. If policy makers continue
to ignore the internal problems associated with modernization
and global change, American interests will only suffer.
Bernard Lewis observes, in a recent Foreign Affairs article,
that
The policy adopted so far, in order to prevent such a
[regional] hegemony, is to encourage, arm and when
necessary support a regional and therefore mainly Arab
security pact. This policy inevitably evokes the
unhappy memory of earlier attempts, which do more harm
than good. This time the proposed pact has a somewhat
better chance. The presumed enemy is no longer the
redoubtable Soviet Union, and regional rulers are
taking a more sober view of the world and their place
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in it. But such a pact, based on unstable regimes
ruling volatile societies, is inherently precarious,
and the chain is no stronger than its weakest link.
The recent history of Iraq illustrates the different
ways that such a policy can go wrong. By embracing
the monarchy, we procured its overthrow; by fostering
Saddam Hussein, we nurtured a monster. It would be
fatally easy to repeat either or both these errors,
with considerable risk to our interests in the region
and terrible consequences for the people who live
there. [Ref . 82:p. Ill]
This thesis has tried to demonstrate how developing
societies of the Arabian peninsula are vulnerable to internal
political instability and how American policy can,
unknowingly, contribute to that instability. As these
societies continue to modernize and old structures of the
traditional system breakdown, more and more groups become
available for political mobilization. Indeed, with rising
awareness and expectations, they begin to demand more say in
the conduct and future of their society. A sentiment
increasingly echoed in the Arab world,
...suggests that the key to defining Arab participa-
tion in the new Middle East will come, in the end, not
from rulers, but from the ruled. Internal renewal- -or
failing that, revolution- -seems likely to be the
vehicle for generating a more confident and effective
Arab response to the challenges of global change.
[Ref. 83]
The problem is that the ruling families of the Gulf appear
reluctant to expand the political system to assimilate new
groups demanding more say in the process. They are grasping
at the old institutions and traditional means of governing
Arabian society and neglecting the inevitable demand for
greater participation. Only reluctantly, due to pressures
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created by the Gulf war, have some of these regimes moved to
form institutions which give the appearance of political
reform. If history is an indicator, these experiments in
participatory institutions will fail, or at most, serve as
facades of political development.
If emerging groups in these societies continue to be
excluded from the decision-making process, they will become
increasingly available for mobilization by various ideologies.
In the past it was Arab nationalism, today it may well be
Islamic fundamentalism or even a more particularist form of
liberal nationalism. Regardless, these ideologies draw upon
the discontent created by the social upheaval associated with
modernization and use symbols to mobilize support in opposi-
tion to regimes. In the Middle Eastern experience, the most
powerful symbol has been anti-imperialism. Discussing the
role of Islamic fundamentalism in the 1990s, Bernard Lewis
notes that,
The eclipse of pan-Arabism has left Islamic fundamen-
talism as the most attractive alternative to all those
who feel that there has to be something better, truer
and more hopeful than the inept tyrannies of their
rulers and the bankrupt ideologies foisted on them
from outside. These movements feed on privation and
humiliation and on the frustration and resentments to
which they give rise, after the failure of all the
political and economic nostrums, both foreign imports
and the local imitations. As seen by many in the
Middle East and North Africa, both capitalism and
socialism were tried and have failed; both Western and
Eastern models produced only poverty and tyranny. It
may seem unjust that in Algeria, for example, the West
should be blamed for the pseudo-Stalinist policies of
an anti-Western government, for the failure of the one
and the ineptitude of the other. But popular
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sentiment is not entirely wrong in seeing the Western
world and Western ideas as the ultimate source of the
major changes that have transformed the Islamic world
in the last century or more . As a consequence much of
their anger is directed against the Westerner, seen as
the ancient and immemorial enemy of Islam since before
the Crusades, and against the Westernizer, seen as a
tool or accomplice of the West and as a traitor to his
own people. [Ref. 82 :p. 115]
Indeed, it was this symbol and perception that mobilized
ideologically diverse elements in Iranian society to overthrow
the shah in 1979.
By the 1970s, the image of the United States that had
taken hold among those Iranians disaffected with the
royal dictatorship was that of a superpower exploiting
Iran's resources and strategic position for its own
benefit. The shah's diverse religious and secular
opponents accused him of being little more than a U.S.
puppet, a leader serving the interests of U.S.
economic and military interests to the detriment of
Iran. [Ref. 45:p. 219]
Today, the popular perception of the link between American
military power and the political survival of the GCC ruling
families (magnified by the Gulf War) , is one that should not
be ignored nor underestimated.
A. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the above, the following policy recommendations
should be considered.
1 . Greater Awareness
American policy makers need to be more aware of the
perception that the U.S. military-oriented policy is creating
in the Gulf today and what that perception can do to the
political stability of the pro-American regimes. Get away
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from the success of Desert Storm and the idea that interests
can be protected by military force alone. While each action
that the U.S. has taken in the region since the Gulf war can
probably be justified on its own individual merits, the
actions should be viewed together as an entire package. The
image that emerges is one of overwhelming military force. It
gives the appearance to inhabitants of the region of the same
old monolithic imperial penetration of the area that they have
been dealing with for a hundred years. Whether that is
reality or not matters little if that image can be used to
ferment political instability.
Accompanying this should be an increased focus on
internal domestic political developments and a greater aware-
ness that American interests are probably more threatened from
an internal challenge than from an external aggressor. The
heavy reliance on military power to protect U.S. interests
since the Gulf war suggests that the focus remains outward.
2 . Reduce the Imperial Perception
Lower the profile of American forces in the region if
by no other way than to reduce the publicity. This does not
mean disengage. It means simply go back to an "over-the-
horizon" presence. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
there is no external actor that is capable of achieving
hegemony in the Gulf. Only regional powers may challenge the
status quo. It is doubtful, however, that Iran would try to
challenge American power overtly. Iran's leaders are fully
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aware of what U.S. forces did to Iraq's million-man army, as
well as the drubbing their own forces took during the clashes
in the Gulf during the late 1980s. Further, in a crisis stern
messages can be delivered through diplomatic (third party)
channels, if necessary, to demonstrate political and military
resolve. Additionally, Iranian leaders are cognizant of the
presence of American forces over the horizon through their own
military sensors. It is the leadership that needs to be
deterred, not the mass of Muslims in the region.
A more effective means for Iran to undermine American
influence in the Gulf would be to subvert pro-American regimes
by using the expanded U.S. military presence as a means to
mobilize anti-Western sentiment. If the U.S. reduces the
public symbolic value of the military presence, much of the
ideological appeal of the Iranian message is lost.
3 . Encourage Political Reform
Continue to encourage GCC regimes, both publicly and
privately, to reform their political system in order to expand
political participation within the societies. The motivations
here are pragmatic rather than altruistic, because political
reform will incorporate potentially destabilizing social
groups in society. If they are not brought into the system,
they may turn to other means to express their views. There
is, of course, difficulty in this. Inevitably, political
reform will mean a loss of influence and power for the ruling




Reduce arms sales to the region and work to establish
a real arms control regime. Until some efforts are made in
this direction, there will be no means to control the Iranian
expansion diplomatically. Further, these nations, including
Saudi Arabia, for a variety of reasons, are not capable of
defending themselves against a determined regional aggressor.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait demonstrated how ill -prepared
these nations (despite the possession of sophisticated weapon
systems) were to counter that threat. The only visible way
that these countries are going to establish a credible
military force is to make real strides toward integration.
For the moment the prospects for this appear dim. American
policy should instead concentrate on lower level security
assistance that builds on infrastructure and forms indigenous
forces that are capable of countering some kind of internal





This final issue is important because the Arab- Israeli
dispute "underlies and permeates the other problems of the
region, and for which a solution is critical to ensure
enduring peace and security." [Ref. 48 :p. 9] Genuine
American efforts to push this forward on an evenhanded level
can go a long way toward improving the overall image of the
United States in the region. Currently the talks appear to be
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faltering due, many believe, to an American preoccupation with
domestic elections. It is important to aggressively reinvigo-
rate the process through active participation. If the talks
fail, it will undoubtedly lead to increased political
radicalization and instability throughout the entire region.
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